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Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal
Stand Your Ground
AYA GRUBER*
Stand-your-ground laws have come to symbolize, especially for many in
the center-to-left, the intense racial injustice of the modern American
criminal system. The idea now ingrained in the minds of many racial
justice-seekers is that only by narrowing the definition of self-defense
(and thereby generally strengthening murder law) can we ensure
Trayvon Martin's death was not in vain. However, when the story of
Martin's killing first appeared on the national stage, the conversation
was not primarily about the overly lenient nature of Florida's self-
defense law. It was a multi-faceted dialogue about neighborhood war-
riors, criminal racial profiling, and especially the racially discrimina-
tory nature of police and prosecutorial discretion. After nearly two
years of talking about the case, however, concerns over Florida state
actors' racially biased application of the law have virtually evaporated
in the face of the throng of arguments that stand your ground is inher-
ently poor criminal policy. The nature of the Zimmerman conversation is
now about how stand your ground has exonerated thugs, drug dealers,
and vicious killers all over the racial spectrum and the law's correlation
with increased homicides. This Article explores why many progressives
decided to focus their advocacy efforts away from clear issues of ine-
quality and toward legal reform to make it more difficult for future
defendants to plead self-defense. It maintains that at least part of the
explanation is a punitive impulse deeply entrenched in American psyche
that leads even left-leaning racial justice proponents occasionally to
hastily embrace proposals that augment the very police and
prosecutorial power they otherwise criticize. It accordingly cautions
progressives to be wary of remedying discrimination through programs
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that bypass nonpunitive social, cultural and economic restructurings in
favor of selective carceral management of the few private (non-police)
individuals that can be characterized as transgressing the social order.
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INTRODUCTION
Stand-your-ground laws have come to symbolize, especially for
many in the center-to-left, the intense racial injustice of the modem
American criminal system. The lesson of the George Zimmerman trial
saga is clear: Stand-your-ground laws, which remove from self-defense
law the requirement to retreat before using force, must be repealed.'
Stand your ground came under fire shortly after the Sanford Police
Department's decision to release Zimmerman without charges, and
opponents of the law ramped up their efforts in the wake of Zimmer-
man's acquittal.2 There have been several recent state-level challenges
1. See, e.g., Trymaine Lee, Minister: Latest Teen Murder Shows Stand Your Ground 'Reeks
of Racism', MSNBC (Nov. 29, 2012, 10:35 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/minister-latest-
teen-murder-shows-stand-your (discussing white gun collector's shooting of an unarmed black
teenager); Sean Sullivan, Four Reasons Why 'Stand Your Ground' Laws Won't Be Repealed,
WASH. POST (July 19, 2013, 10:11 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/
07/19/four-reasons-why-stand-your-ground-laws-wont-be-repealed/; Eugene Robinson, Op-Ed.,
Dangerous 'Ground', WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2012, at A17 (arguing for repeal on the ground that
the laws "are nothing but a license to kill"); see also Sarah Childress, Is There Racial Bias in
"Stand Your Ground" Laws?, PBS FRONTLINE.COM (July 31, 2012, 12:40 PM), http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/criminal-justice/is-there-racial-bias-in-stand-your-ground-
laws/ (quoting commissioner Michael Yaki as stating that the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
intends to determine whether "SYG statutes by their nature .. . create opportunities for racial bias
to enter into the system"); cf Transcript: President Obama Addresses Race, Profiling and Florida
Law, CNN (July 19, 2013, 2:49 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/19/politics/obama-
zimmerman-verdict/index.html, (calling for reexamination of stand-your-ground).
2. See Maggie Clark, Zimmerman Verdict Renews Focus on 'Stand Your Ground' Laws,
USA TODAY (July 15, 2013, 2:56 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/15/
stateline-zimmerman-stand-your-ground/2517507/; Adie Rolnick & Priscilla Ocen, Op-Ed., Why
We Must Do More than Repeal 'Stand Your Ground' Laws, AL JAZEERA.COM (Aug. 3, 2013, 3:05
PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/07/2013728142158307153.html ("In the
wake [sic] the jury's acquittal of Zimmerman, people across the country marched, rallied, and
protested to express their collective disgust with the unequal system of justice represented by the
Zimmerman verdict.").
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to the laws, some more successful than others. Congress has even
stepped in, convening hearings on the wisdom of continued retention of
such laws and taking emotional witness testimony from Trayvon Mar-
tin's mother and other slain victims' family members.' The idea now
ingrained in the minds of many racial justice-seekers is that only by
narrowing the definition of self-defense (and thereby generally strength-
ening murder law) can we ensure Trayvon's death was not in vain.
Indeed, this notion follows a familiar pattern in American penal culture.
Publicity of tragic killings of innocent youths at the hands of deviant
criminals (or perceived criminals) often sparks calls for greater severity
in the criminal law.6 The Zimmerman case is nevertheless somewhat
unusual given political conservatives' support for the criminal defendant
and liberals' push for tough prosecution. Conservatives typically tend to
embrace tough-on-crime responses to high-profile criminal cases while
liberals are often more cognizant about the human, social, and economic
costs of ratcheting-up punishment.' In this case, however, the political
roles are reversed, with conservatives backing a robust murder defense
and progressives, including racial justice scholars, supporting vigorous
law enforcement and prosecution.8
3. See 'Stand Your Ground Law' Survives Florida House Vote, FOX NEWs (Nov. 8, 2013),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/11/08/stand-your-ground-law-survives-florida-house-vote/; see
also Sean Sullivan, Everything You Need to Know About 'Stand Your Ground' Laws, WASH. POST
(July 15, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/07/15/
everything-you-need-to-know-about-stand-your-ground-laws/ (noting that a repeal bill passed the
New Hampshire House but was defeated in the Senate).
4. See Laurie Kellman, Trayvon Martin's Mother Testifies at Senate Hearing on 'Stand Your
Ground' Laws, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trayvon-
martins-mother-testifies-at-senate-hearing-on-stand-your-ground-laws/2013/10/29/94285480-
40c6-1 1e3-a624-4ld66lb0bb78_story.html.
5. See Editorial, The Next Step After the Trayvon Martin Case, SEATTLE TIMEs (July 15,
2013, 4:35 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/editorials/2021400256_edittrayvonzimmerman
16xml.html ("The single best memorial to Trayvon Martin-Justice for Trayvon-is repeal of
Florida's Stand Your Ground law."); Curt Anderson, Sybrina Fulton, Trayvon Martin's Mother,
Continues Fight to Repeal 'Stand Your Ground' Law, HUFFINGTON POST (July 29, 2013, 2:31
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/29/sybrina-fulton-trayvon-martin-stand-your-
ground-n_3671615.html ("We have to change the law so that this doesn't happen to someone
else's child.").
6. Marcia J. Simon, Note, An Inappropriate and Unnecessary Expansion of Felony Murder
in Maryland, 65 MD. L. REv. 992, 1016 (2006) (noting the pressure on prosecutors to be tough on
crime "especially in the midst of the public outcry that often accompanies a tragic death"); Erik G.
Luna, Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 7 (1998) (describing the
ingredients of three strikes laws as including "a few horrible but isolated incidents of violence;
and election-year politicians 'getting tough on crime' through a simple catch-phrase").
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See Sabrina Siddiqui, Ted Cruz Defends Stand Your Ground, Says Lawmakers Want to
'Exploit' Trayvon Martin's Death, HUFFINOTON POST (Oct. 29, 2013, 2:31 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/29/ted-cruz-stand-your-groundn4174430.html (reporting that
Republican Louie Gohmert "cited his experience as a defense attorney and listed off a series of
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Today, it is nearly impossible to talk about Trayvon Martin's kill-
ing without discussing the desirability of stand-your-ground laws. How-
ever, when the story first appeared on the national stage, the
conversation was not primarily about the overly lenient nature of Flor-
ida's self-defense law. It was a multi-faceted dialogue about neighbor-
hood warriors, racial profiling, and especially the racially discriminatory
nature of police and prosecutorial discretion.9 At that early stage, Mar-
tin's parents and their attorneys emphasized, not that the police merely
followed an unjust law, but that a police force with a racially fraught
history chose not to arrest, despite having valid legal grounds to do so.' 0
The question arising most frequently in the immediate wake of the
shooting was: "If the races were reversed, would police have made an
arrest?"" After nearly two years of talking about stand your ground and
numerous nascent studies of the law, this question has been buried if not
answered in the negative.12 Concerns over Florida police and prosecu-
tors' racially biased application of the law have virtually evaporated in
the face of the throng of arguments and evidence showing that stand
your ground is inherently poor criminal policy. 13
The nature of the Zimmerman conversation has thus fundamentally
changed. It is now about how stand your ground has exonerated thugs,
drug dealers, and vicious killers all over the racial spectrum and how the
law correlates with an uptick in homicide rates.14 Under this rubric, San-
cases where he successfully defended black individuals against murder charges" and quoting
Democrat Richard Durbin as stating stand-your-ground laws "are diminishing accountability
under the justice system"). Fascinatingly, by some accounts, Democrats ended up voting for the
Florida Bill in order to avoid being seen as "soft on crime." Katie Sanders, Democrats Warned
About 'Stand Your Ground' in 2005, TAMPA BAY TIMEs (Mar. 22, 2012, 7:29 PM), http://www.
tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/democrats-warned-about-stand-your-ground-in-2005/1221
368.
9. See Monique 0. Madan, Shooting Mystery: Miami-Dade Teen Killed by a Crime Watch
Captain, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.husd.org/cms/lib07/AZ0O1001450/Centricity/
Domain/2090/3-9%20Martin%20Shot.pdf (reporting that Martin's mother objected to the police's
reluctance to prosecute and noting that the Martins' attorney, Benjamin Crump, stated that "the
neighborhood watch was supposed to protect him, not kill him" and opined that Martin was
racially profiled).
10. John Rudolf & Trymaine Lee, Trayvon Martin Case Spotlights Florida Town's History of
'Sloppy' Police Work, HUFFINGTON PosT (Apr. 9, 2012, 1:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2012/04/09/trayvon-martin-cops-botched-investigation n-1409277.html (discussing past
mistreatment of African Americans by the Sanford police).
11. See Mike Schneider, Parents of Slain Black Teen Want FBI Investigation, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Mar. 17, 2012, at 8C (stating that the parents of Trayvon Martin argued that Sanford
police failed to arrest "Zimmerman because he is white and their son was black").
12. See infra notes 77, 265-68.
13. See Susan Taylor Martin et al., Race Plays Complex Role in Florida's 'Stand Your
Ground' Law, TAMPA BAY TIMEs (June 2, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/
courts/criminal/race-plays-complex-role-in-floridas-stand-your-ground-law/1233152.
14. See, e.g., Tim Murphy, Justifiable Homicides up 200 Percent in Florida Post-Stand Your
964 [Vol. 68:961
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ford Police Chief Jim Lee and prosecutor Angela Corey are off the
hook-they merely followed a misguided law that forced them to treat
Zimmerman, and other culpable murderers, leniently.15 But this new
preoccupation with black letter leniency hides one of the most important
points about the case. Florida's self-defense regime, like all criminal law
regimes, invested Lee and Corey with discretion-discretion they argu-
ably exercised in a racialized manner. Whatever the fate of the stand-
your-ground provision, police discretion to arrest (or decline to arrest)
and prosecutorial discretion to prosecute (or decline to prosecute) are
destined to remain.' 6 It is thus possible that repealing stand your ground
will increase Florida murder convictions generally, but leave untouched,
or possibly even exacerbate, racial disparities." In any case, the racial
disparity question has been all but forgotten in the rush of arguments
that stand your ground is too lenient on criminals and encourages vio-
lence." While debates continue to rage in statehouses over the fate of
self-defense law, the racial outrage generated by the case has been rele-
gated to a prospective celebrity boxing match between Zimmerman and
troubled rapper DMX.'9
This Article explores how radical concerns over racial stereotyping,
fortressed communities, and discriminatory policing and prosecution
morphed into the old-hat, hackneyed set of retributive and utilitarian
arguments that lenient self-defense laws underpunish offenders and
Ground, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 16, 2013, 11:36 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/09/
stand-your-ground-justifiable-homicide-increase (citing report that found justifiable homicides
have increased 53% on average in the twenty-two states that have stand-your-ground laws); Josh
Gerstein, Eric Holder: Stand Your Ground Undermines Public Safety, POLITICO (July 16, 2013,
4:56 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/eric-ho (quoting Attorney General Eric Holder
stating stand-your-ground laws may be "allowing and perhaps encouraging violent situations to
escalate in public"); Shankar Vendantam, 'Stand Your Ground' Linked to Increase in Homicides,
NPR (Jan. 2, 2013, 4:50 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/01/02/167984117/-stand-your-ground-
linked-to-increase-in-homicide; Kris Hundley et al., Florida 'Stand Your Ground' Law Yields
Some Shocking Outcomes Depending on How Law Is Applied, TAMPA BAY TIMEs (Jun. 1, 2012,
11:25 AM), http://www.tampabay.comlnews/publicsafety/cime/florida-stand-your-ground-law-
yields-some-shocking-outcomes-depending-on/1233133 ("Florida's 'stand your ground' law has
allowed drug dealers to avoid murder charges and gang members to walk free.").
15. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 80, 258, and accompanying text. See also Rolnick & Ocen, supra note 2.
17. See infra notes 79, 242-46, 252, and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Morgan Whitaker, Stand Your Ground: Good for Defense Attorneys, Bad for
Citizens, MSNBC (Nov. 22, 2013, 7:31 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/politicsnation/stand-your-
ground-who-it-helps-and-hurts; David Hemenway, Don't Ignore the Evidence: Stand Your
Ground Is Bad for Florida, HUFFINGTON PosT (Nov. 13, 2012, 10:32 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/david-hemenway-phd/stand-your-ground-b-2119322.html.
19. Gerrick D. Kennedy, DMX, George Zimmerman 'Celebrity' Boxing Match Not Done
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increase crime. The relentless preoccupation with stand your ground is
all the more amazing in light of evidence that police, prosecutor, and
jury discretion ultimately contributed more to the verdict than stand your
ground.2 0 So why did many progressives decide to focus their advocacy
efforts away from clear issues of inequality and toward legal reform to
make it more difficult for future defendants to plead self-defense? The
answer is undoubtedly complex and multifaceted. Perhaps it was hap-
penstance. The media seized on stand your ground because it sounds
provocative and audiences responded.2t It also might be that progres-
sives targeted stand your ground because of the law's close connection
to the conservative gun lobby and the significance of the gun control
debate at the time.22 Nevertheless, racial equality has not historically
been a principal ground for gun control, and yet stand-your-ground laws
are currently a racial lightning rod.2 3 This Article asserts that at least part
of the explanation of some progressives' emphasis on repealing stand
your ground involves a punitive impulse, deeply entrenched in the
20. See supra notes 15-16, infra 189-91, and accompanying text; Kris Hundley, Despite
Backlash, 'Stand Your Ground' Laws Did Not Apply to Zimmerman Case, TAMPA BAY TIMES
(July 15, 2013, 9:31 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/despite-outcry-
zimmermans-acquittal-was-not-based-on-stand-your-ground-laws/2131629; George Zimmerman's
Attorneys Won't Use "Stand Your Ground" Defense, CBS NEws (Aug. 13, 2012, 7:32 PM), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/george-zimmermans-attorneys-wont-use-stand-your-ground-defense/.
21. The earliest post-Martin shooting mention of stand your ground in national media I could
find was an Ashleigh Banfield interview with a criminal law talking head on March 13, 2012.
Introducing stand your ground, attorney Paul Callan states, "You know, I was kind of shocked,
Ashleigh, when I was looking at the research on this stand your ground law. There have been
about 65 cases in Florida involving deaths where this law has been the deciding factor in the case.
You know, in New York, for instance, most of the big states, if somebody attacks you, you have
an obligation to try to retreat first before you can use deadly physical force," to which Banfield
replies, "Wow!" Early Start with Ashleigh Banfield, VOXANT BUSINESS TRANSCIUPrs, Mar. 13,
2012 available at 2012 WLNR 5392624. Indeed, what the media emphasizes is often a function of
hegemonic cultural forces that disfavor open discussions of more "touchy" subjects like racism in
criminal justice.
22. See Matt Gertz, ALEC Has Pushed the NRA's "Stand Your Ground" Law Across the
Nation, MEDIA MATTERS (Mar. 21, 2012, 11:41 AM), http://mediamatters.org/blog/2012/03/21/
alec-has-pushed-the-nras-stand-your-ground-law/186459; John Nichols, How ALEC Took
Florida's 'License to Kill' Law National, NATION (Mar. 21, 2012, 10:57 PM), http://
www.thenation.com/blog/166978/how-alec-took-floridas-license-kill-law-national#. In the year
following the Trayvon Martin shooting, two horrific mass shootings spurred heated national
conversation and debates on Capitol Hill. See Michael Cooper, Debate on Gun Control Is Revived,
amid a Trend Toward Fewer Restrictions, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/12/16/us/politics/connecticut-shooting-revives-gun-control-debate.htmi (lawmakers review
gun control laws following Sandy Hook shooting); see also Michael Martinez, Gun-Control, Gun-
Rights Groups Ready for Renewed Debate After Colorado Shooting, CNN (July 21, 2012, 11:28
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/20/us/colorado-gun-control-debate/ ("nation's largest citizens'
lobby to prevent gun violence pledged aggressive action" following Holmes theater shooting).
23. See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 337 (1991) (supporting a robust 2nd
Amendment right as a matter of racial justice).
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American psyche, that leads even left-leaning racial justice proponents
occasionally to hastily embrace proposals that augment the very police
and prosecutorial power they otherwise criticize.
The punitive impulse is a component of a late twentieth-century
American penal eidos that gives criminal prosecution a high rank-order
among possible methods of addressing pressing social problems.2 4 Pre-
vailing conventional punitive ideology views top-down policing as the
solution to, not cause of, societal violence.25 It leads policymakers and
advocates to bypass nonpunitive social, cultural, and economic restruc-
turings in favor of selective carceral management of the few private
(non-police) individuals that can be characterized as transgressing the
social order.26 The long-term ascendency of this ideology has left a dis-
tinctive mark in the form of a punitive impulse-a pre-political, almost
unconscious correlation of social harm (in this case, the racial injustice
of Trayvon Martin's death) with the need for greater or more certain
criminal punishment of the individual(s) most easily connected to the
injustice (in this case, George Zimmerman and future Zimmermans).
The punitive impulse triggers an instinctive reaction to harm that natu-
ralizes increased criminal enforcement as a solution of first resort. The
impulse accordingly operates to check the usual progressive inclination
to regard criminal sanctions as a last resort to be chosen only after care-
ful distributive analysis.2 7 Thus, the evidence that the impulse is at work
in progressive analysis of the Zimmerman case is not the fact that some
progressives ultimately condemned stand your ground, but in many
progressives' precipitous rush to repeal stand your ground to the exclu-
24. See infra notes 274-88 and accompanying text; see also Jonathan Simon, From a Tight
Place: Crime, Punishment, and American Liberalism, 17 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 853, 854 (1999)
(book review) (noting that Reagan and Bush "embraced punishment as one of the few forms of
domestic governance defensible within their political ideology") (footnotes omitted); Angela P.
Harris, Bad Subjects: The Practice of Theory and the Constitution of Identity in Legal Culture, 9
CARDOZO WOMEN's L.J. 515, 516 (2003) [hereinafter Harris, Bad Subjects] (asserting that within
conservative ideology "questions relating to crime and 'welfare,' for example, become personal
moral issues rather than social problems").
25. See infra notes 267, 274; Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice,
52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 799 (2000) ("In liberal democracies, the exercise of state violence, both in
the domestic realm and in foreign relations, is justified by reference to the values of protection,
security, and order.").
26. See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REv. 741, 822-23 (2007)
(asserting that "'progressive' criminal reforms rest on the assumption that proper education of
state actors will enable the criminal system to empower rather than subordinate minorities";
however, "most criminal law reforms end up becoming yet another procedural vehicle for
warehousing the worst off").
27. See generally Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 COLo. L. REv. 129,
132-34 (2014) (contrasting progressives who seek narrower provocation laws and concentrate on
spectacular gender-based harm with those who seek to remedy racial bias in the death penalty
through abolition and concentrate on the distributive and institutional problems with capital
punishment).
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sion of emphasizing more radical, non-authoritarian, egalitarian, and
culture-changing measures.
In making the case that a punitive impulse influenced, at least in
part, certain progressives to focus on stand your ground, the Article will
address several aspects of the Zimmerman case. Part I will trace the
origin of the public stand-your-ground discussion in order to shed light
on the continued emphasis on the doctrine, despite evidence that the law
may have played a very small, if any, causal role in determining the
verdict. Part II will examine several cultural and legal predicates of the
shooting and the not-guilty verdict, aside from the stand-your-ground
law, which have and should continue to give racial justice scholars
pause, but receive little current attention. Part III will analyze whether
stand-your-ground is an appropriate locus of racial symbolism by inves-
tigating the law's actual racial effects. Finally, Part IV will discuss the
concept of a punitive impulse, including its origins, its operation, and
the implications for progressive theorizing and advocacy.
PART I: STAND YOUR GROUND'S LEGAL AND CULTURAL MEANINGS
On the first day of my Spring 2014 criminal law course at the Uni-
versity of Colorado Law School, ninety-one first-year law students, not
yet jaded by having experienced an entire year of legal matriculation, sat
listening attentively to my introductory lecture on substantive criminal
law. In the first class of each semester, I broadly describe general crimi-
nal law principles. This semester, in discussing ways to defend against a
crime, I asked the class, "What's an example of a widely-known affirm-
ative defense?" A student shouted out, "Stand your ground!" while
others nodded vigorously. In these students' minds, not only is stand
your ground an affirmative defense in itself, it is the affirmative defense.
Stand your ground has come to virtually replace self-defense in popular
vernacular. Moreover, stand your ground, it appears, is not just an idiom
for self-defense-it has a particular meaning. For many, the meaning is
literal. 8 The law is about standing up for oneself in the face of a current
or immediate-past confrontation.2 9 In this view, the law broadly enables
28. See Jeannie Suk, Self Defense Is Part of Our Heritage, N.Y. TIMEs (March 21, 2012, 9:22
PM) [hereinafter Suk, Heritage], http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/03/21/do-stand-
your-ground-laws-encourage-vigilantes/self-defense-is-part-of-our-heritagex ("The real outrages
are not actually in the provisions of the new self-defense laws, as nothing in those laws give
permission to shoot or refuse to retreat when one isn't attacked to begin with. The dangers lie
rather in incorrect and confused law enforcement perceptions of what the law allows, fueled by
the cultural background and emotions that surrounded the laws' passage.").
29. The familiar critical mantra is that stand your ground's main function is "allowing-and
perhaps encouraging-violent situations to escalate in public." Lindsey Boerma, Holder: "Stand
Your Ground" Allows, Encourages Escalating Violence, CBS NEWS (July 16, 2013, 10:39 PM),
968 [Vol. 68:961
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a person to preserve his sense of security or pride through deadly means,
even possibly allowing one to shoot his fleeing opponent in the back.3 0
The expansive cultural meaning of stand your ground also encompasses
the notion of "shoot first" and "shoot at anytime," meaning that even the
subtlest threats justify deadly force and even first aggressors may stand
their grounds."1
Given that much of society interprets stand your ground to entitle
people to just shoot away, it is no surprise that many believe that the
2005 Amendment to Florida's self-defense statute adding the stand-
your-ground provision3 2 affected a monumental shift in self-defense
doctrine." However, the legal meaning of the doctrine (removing duty
to retreat) is far narrower than the cultural meaning, and the law is not so
doctrinally revolutionary.3 4 Indeed, American jurists have debated for
well over a century the question of whether a person who reasonably
fears imminent bodily injury and reasonably believes defensive force is
necessary must first attempt to retreat before using force.3 5 For example,
the Kansas Supreme Court declared in 1896, "A person who is unlaw-
fully attacked by another may stand his ground, and use such force as at
the time reasonably appears to him to be necessary to protect himself."3 6
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/holder-stand-your-ground-allows-encourages-escalating-violence/
(quoting Attorney General Holder).
30. See Interview with Sunny Hostin, CNN NEWSROOM (CNN Mar. 14, 2012), available at
2012 WLNR 6247518 (stating that under stand your ground, "[y]ou can shoot the person in the
back"); Hundley et al., supra note 14 (profiling stand-your-ground cases where defendants who
had shot victims in the back successfully utilized the defense).
31. See, e.g., Repeal Florida's Reckless "Shoot First" Law That Shields Trayvon's Killer,
CHANGE, http://www.change.org/petitions/repeal-florida-s-reckless-shoot-first-law-that-shields-
trayvon-s-killer (last visited Mar. 21, 2014); John Nichols, Outrage Is Rising Against Stand Your
Ground, NATION (July 16, 2013, 10:01 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/175312/outrage-
rising-florida-and-nationally-against-stand-your-ground (Mayor Bloomberg referring to stand-
your-ground laws as "shoot first" laws).
32. Codified as FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013).
33. See, e.g., Susan Ferriss, NRA Was Behind Spread of 'Stand Your Ground' Laws Across
Nation, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Mar. 28, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 6612148 (calling the law
"unprecedented"); Adam Weinstein, How the NRA and Its Allies Helped Spread a Radical Gun
Law Nationwide, MOTHER JONES (June 7, 2012, 2:10 AM), http://www.mothejones.com/politics/
2012/06/nra-alec-stand-your-ground.
34. See Suk, Heritage, supra note 28 (stating that "the provisions of legislation like Florida's,
eliminating the duty to retreat from an attacker in public space before killing in self defense, are
not in themselves radical departures from what we have traditionally known").
35. See Recent Cases, Criminal Law-Self Defense-Duty to Retreat.-State v. Gardner, 971
N. W (Minn.) 971, 15 YALE L.J. 194, 196 (1906) [hereinafter Recent Cases] ("The application of
the doctrine 'retreat to the wall,' as stated in Coke, has been undergoing a change in this country
in recent years and in some of the jurisdictions has been positively relaxed. The Supreme Court, in
recent cases, has approved of the modifications of the old common law doctrine and held that a
person 'was not obliged to retreat' under the circumstances.") (internal citations omitted).
36. State v. Hatch, 57 Kan. 420, 420 (1896); see also Beard v. United States, 15 S. Ct. 962,
967 (1895) (finding no duty to retreat).
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The popularity of the retreat rule in state criminal law has peaked and
troughed over time, reflecting different political and social sensibilities
regarding defensive force. Even prior to the stand-your-ground revolu-
tion in the late 2000s, retreat was often the exception rather than prevail-
ing rule in American self-defense law."
The inherent political valence of the duty to retreat is not entirely
clear. On the one hand, the notion of standing one's ground derives from
a North American rugged-individualism sensibility in which free citi-
zens must have access to self-protection.38 Additionally, it reflects mas-
culinist norms regarding "true men's" behavior during contests of
power.39 In these senses, self-defense laws without the duty to retreat are
politically conservative in nature. On the other hand, there has always
been civil-libertarian skepticism of the duty to retreat. One popular argu-
ment against the duty is that prosecutors, courts, and jurors are not in a
good position to second-guess the decision making of defendants and
should not require those being attacked to forfeit their lives.4 0 Accord-
ingly, defenders generally disfavor the duty to retreat because it permits
prosecutors to gain convictions even in clear cases of unprovoked
attacks by asserting the defendant could have retreated. In this sense,
like other leniency principles in criminal law, stand your ground can be
seen as progressive in that it protects individuals from the punitive
authority of the state.4 1
37. See Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their
Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 389 n.51 (1993) (stating that "[tihe majority ofjurisdictions today
do not require retreat" and "[e]xceptions and limitations to the retreat rule exist even in
jurisdictions requiring retreat" and citing extensive authority).
38. See RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, No Dirry To RETREAT: VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY 5-6 (1991).
39. See Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 237, 245 (2008) [hereinafter Suk, The True Woman].
40. See Recent Cases, supra note 35, at 196 ("The reason for this change [eliminating the
duty to retreat] appears to be the general introduction of firearms, and the recognition by courts
that self-defense should not be distorted by an unreasonable requirement of the duty to retreat, into
self-destruction."). Cf D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
255, 265 (2006) (explaining one of the historical grounds for the castle doctrine as protecting from
government invasions of the home and calling the doctrine "an important intellectual foundation
of the Fourth Amendment").
41. In response to the Marissa Alexander case, a Florida Republican introduced a bill to
expand stand your ground to cover "warning shots." In supporting the measure, a representative
from the Florida Public Defender Association stated:
The public defenders are, in general, in favor of having judges have discretion about
sentencing as opposed to mandatory punishments. And so we felt like, with the
amendments that were made to House Bill 89 in its current version, that there was
some really important legislative-intent language that talked about 10-20-Life and
encouraged prosecutors to not seek those kinds of punishments on people who
threaten to use force in self-defense.
Public Defenders Back Revised 'Warning Shot' Bill, CBS MIAMu (Dec. 13, 2013, 10:40 PM),
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In recent times, the duty-to-retreat debate has increasingly comin-
gled with the national gun-control debate.4 2 Gun rights supporters in the
last decade have called for broad judicial interpretations and legislative
expansions of the historic "castle doctrine," which allows the use of
deadly force against a home invader, subject to various limitations. In
the early 2000s, the NRA and the conservative lobbying group Ameri-
can Legislative Exchange Council ("ALEC") used Florida as a test case
to determine the level of support for laws broadening the castle doctrine
outside the home." The test proved a conservative success, with the
Florida legislature passing the stand-your-ground law in 2005, over
vocal objections from many Democrats, but without a single negative
vote in the Senate.4 5 By 2012, over two dozen states had adopted
the legislation.4 6 The 2005 Florida stand-your-ground law vote was
intensely politicized because of the overarching concern with gun con-
trol and Florida Democrats' resistance to an NRA and ALEC victory.
After its passage, opponents decried the law as an unprecedented and
radical transformation of the law of self-defense.47
Stand your ground modified Florida self-defense law in two pri-
mary ways: (1) It removed the duty to retreat before using force in a
public place;4 8 and (2) it provided "immunity" to defendants against
whom there was not enough evidence to establish probable cause.49 Tak-
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2013/12/1 3/public-defenders-back-revised-warning-shot-bill/. The
article quotes the state attorney as saying, "We're more concerned about guilty people who hide
behind ('stand your ground'). The defense bar has equal concerns about the other side of the
coin... . I guess our position is that modifying or tweaking the concept is unnecessary in terms of
what we already had in place." Id.
42. See Trayvon Martin's Mother Testifies on 'Stand Your Ground' Laws, AL JAZEERA AM.
(Oct. 29, 2013, 10:00 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/29/trayvon-martin-
smothertestifiesonstandyourgroundlaws.html (noting that the congressional stand-your-ground
hearings "reviv[ed] the politically charged gun control issue a year ahead of the 2014 midterm
elections"); see, e.g., Max Conger, Stand Your Ground Laws Are American Values in Action,
POLICYMIc (July 30, 2013), http://www.policymic.com/articles/57051/stand-your-ground-laws-
are-american-values-in-action ("Stand Your Ground laws are the reasonable legal outcome of the
Second Amendment.").
43. See Suk, The True Woman, supra note 39, at 237-38.
44. See Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand Your Ground Laws, 67 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 827, 836-40 (2013) (discussing history of Florida's 2005 legislation).
45. See Sanders, supra note 8. See also Lave, supra note 44, at 839.
46. See Lave, supra note 44, at 839.
47. See supra note 28.
48. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) ("A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity
and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and
has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he or
she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or
herself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.").
49. FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2013) ("A person who uses force as permitted in s. 776.012,
s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is justified in using such force and is immune from criminal
prosecution . . . .").
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ing each of these changes in turn, removing the duty to retreat is not an
extraordinary reconstitution of self-defense law, given that for years
many jurisdictions operated without a duty to retreat.50 Moreover, while
it may be intuitive to think that removing the duty to retreat makes it
much easier for defendants to plead self-defense, this might not be the
case. Jurisdictions that retain the duty to retreat do not require unequivo-
cal departure but only safe retreat." Thus, in retreat jurisdictions, juries
still can acquit sympathetic defendants who could have retreated by
finding that retreat would have been dangerous. Nevertheless, removing
the duty might make the marginal difference of compelling otherwise
unwilling juries to acquit unsympathetic defendants who could have
retreated. Yet if a jury regards a defendant as wholly unsympathetic,
there are many other avenues toward conviction, for example, finding
that he was the first aggressor, 5 2 holding that harm was not imminent,5 3
or concluding that deadly force was not necessary. 54
The second change was to grant immunity from prosecution to
those who meet the definition of self-defense. Specifically, Florida law
provides that "law enforcement . . . may not arrest the person for using
force unless it determines that there is probable cause that the force that
was used was unlawful."5 However, prior to stand your ground, individ-
uals were already immune from arrest in the absence of probable cause
to believe they committed a crime.56 The most potentially impactful
stand-your-ground reform came by way of Florida courts, not the legis-
lature. Florida courts have interpreted the legislation to guarantee
defendants pleading stand your ground a pretrial "immunity hearing," in
which they can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they acted
in self-defense and are immune from prosecution." This appears to tan-
gibly benefit defendants by giving them two bites of the apple. One may,
however, reason that the first bite is not very consequential. The hearing
puts the burden of proof on the defendant and proceeds in front of a
judge. Given judges' general dispositions toward murder defendants,
50. See Rosen, supra note 37, at 388-89.
51. See Rosen, supra note 37, at 389 n.51 (stating, "[o]f course, a person is required to retreat
only if she can do so in complete safety" and citing sources).
52. See FLA. STAT. § 776.041 (2013) ("The justification described in the preceding sections of
this chapter is not available to a person who . . . [i]nitially provokes the use of force against
himself or herself . . . .").
53. See FLA. STAT. § 776.012(1) (2013) (justifying deadly force when a person "reasonably
believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or
herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony").
54. See id.
55. FLA. STAT. § 776.032(2) (2013).
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
57. Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29-30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (approved by Dennis v.
State, 51 So. 3d 456 (Fla. 2010)).
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one might not think that grants of immunity occur very often." In any
case, this procedure did not affect Zimmerman, as he waived his immu-
nity hearing."
It is difficult to know the exact role the stand-your-ground law
played in the Sanford police's decision to release Zimmerman the morn-
ing after the shooting. There is little evidence the Sanford police were
thinking about the case as a duty-to-retreat (or not) case. Sanford Police
Chief Lee's initial statement to the press on March 12, 2012, explained
that police lacked probable cause because Zimmerman had stated that he
had acted in self-defense, there was no one to contradict his story, Zim-
merman had injuries, and police had not yet processed the evidence from
the scene.6 0 I remember listening to that statement and thinking, "There
is an unarmed dead boy on the street. In what world would the police
find no probable cause based on the self-serving statements of the
shooter?"" Now, it is possible that the stand-your-ground provision
induced the Sanford police to be hyper-vigilant about probable cause
and err on the side of not arresting, even in the face of colorable proba-
ble cause. Another explanation-the one initially publicized by the Mar-
tins' attorneys and supporters-is that the police used restraint in this
case because Martin was a young black male and Zimmerman was a
white(ish) neighborhood watch captain with close police ties.6 2
In the immediate aftermath of the February 26, 2012 shooting, the
Sanford Police Department came under intense public scrutiny, and
58. However, it seems that Florida judges are in fact granting immunity. See Explore Our
'Stand Your Ground' Data, TAMPA BAY TIMEs, http://www.tampabay.com/stand-your-ground-
law/data, (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). Interestingly, the vast majority of those immunity grants
involve non-homicide cases and cases with women killers.
59. Erin McClam, Zimmerman Gambles by Waiving 'Stand Your Ground' Hearing Before
Trial, NBC NEws (Apr. 30, 2013, 4:48 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/30/
17987796-zimmerman-gambles-by-waiving-stand-your-ground-hearing-before-trial?lite.
60. CNN NEWSROOM (CNN Mar. 13, 2012), available at 2012 WLNR 6243191; City of
Sanford in Over its Head, W. ORLANDO NEws (Mar. 12, 2012), http://westorlandonews.comI/2012/
03/12/city-of-sanford-in-over-its-head/.
61. On March 13, 2012, the day after Chief Lee announced that he lacked probable cause to
arrest and the day before Sanford police turned the case over to the prosecutor, Sanford homicide
detective Christopher Serino filed a report recommending arrest stating that Zimmerman's wounds
were "marginally consistent with a life-threatening episode, as described by him, during which
neither a deadly weapon nor deadly force were deployed by Trayvon Martin." Julia Dahl,
Christopher Serino, Cop Who Said George Zimmerman Should Be Charged, Is Transferred from
Investigative Unit, CBS NEWS (June 26, 2012, 4:42 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
christopher-serino-cop-who-said-george-zimmerman-should-be-charged-is-transferred-from-
investigative-unit/.
62. See Schneider, supra note 11 (quoting the Martins' attorney Benjamin Crump as saying,
"[d]o we really believe that if Trayvon Martin would have pulled the trigger, he would not be
arrested?. . . This is obviously a cover-up, and we need a sweeping overhaul of the Sanford Police
Department").
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commentators began to uncover its checkered racial past.63 Within a
week, Martin's family had retained attorneys and were making state-
ments to the press accusing the Sanford police of malfeasance and call-
ing for Zimmerman's prompt arrest.' Critics derided Chief Lee for
referring to Trayvon's tragic death as "an event." 65 Martin's supporters
also chastised the police department for letting the deceased Martin lan-
guish as a "John Doe" for three days without even asking area residents
to identify him.66 Reports also surfaced that police had corrected a wit-
ness who said she heard Trayvon screaming for help, telling her that it
was actually Zimmerman."7 In the weeks following the shooting, much
of the media commentary and most of the sentiments from Martin sup-
porters involved the notion that race had impermissibly influenced white
government officials to treat a white man who racially profiled and
killed a black youth more leniently than other types of suspects.
By mid-March, the case was receiving regular national attention.
CNN featured sound bites and updates on the Trayvon Martin tragedy as
part of its news rotation. While much of the public outcry continued to
revolve around racial profiling and racialized policing, media pundits
began to introduce Florida's stand-your-ground law to news watchers. 8
However, at that early time, attention to the law did not tend to deflect
from the assertion that police and prosecutors had ample grounds to
arrest and charge Zimmerman. 69 By March 19th, the Department of Jus-
tice and FBI had opened a civil rights investigation into whether the
shooting was racially motivated.70 March 21st saw the "million hoodie
march" in New York City, in which protesters shouted "we want
63. See, e.g., Countusin, Video 2010 Sanford FL: Cop Son Caught On Camera Beating Black
Homeless Man . . . Sergeant Anthony Raimondo Declined to Arrest Him; Same Sergeant that
Didn't Arrest Zimmerman, WoRDPREss (Mar. 27, 2012), http://countusin.wordpress.com/2012/03/
27/2010-sanford-fl-cops-son-caught-on-camera-beating-homeless-man-sergeant-anthony-
raimondo-declined-to-arrest-same-sergeant-that-didnt-arrest-zimmerman/; State Attorney's Offices
Overwhelmed by Emails Demanding Justice for Slain Teen, WFTV (Mar. 15, 2012, 5:03 PM),
http://www.wftv.com/news/news/local/state-attorneys-offices-overwhelmed-emails-demandi/
nLTdJ/.
64. See Rudolf & Lee, supra note 10.
65. Fabiola Santiago, Unarmed Teen's Killing in Sanford Deserves Answers, MIAMI HERALD
(Mar. 13, 2012), available at 2012 WLNR 5409814.
66. See Isabelle Zehnder, Trayvon Martin in Morgue 3 Days as 'John Doe' After Mom
Reported Him Missing, ExAMINER (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/trayvon-
martin-morgue-3-days-as-john-doe-after-mom-reported-him-missing.
67. See Trayvon Lawyer: Police Trying to Blame Victim, CBS NEws (Apr. 16, 2012, 9:34
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trayvon-lawyer-police-trying-to-blame-victim/.
68. See infra notes 76-80.
69. See, e.g., Interview with Sunny Hostin, CNN Newsroom (CNN Mar. 13, 2012), available
at 2012 WLNR 6245521 ("[W~e know that Florida has sort of the most expansive, I think, stand-
your-ground law in our country, meaning you don't have to retreat. You can defend yourself. But
there's always that exception, even in Florida, about the first aggressor.").
70. See Matt Gutman et al., FBI, Justice Department to Investigate Killing of Trayvon Martin
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arrests."" On March 22nd, Chief Lee stepped down, and the embattled
local prosecutor resigned from the case, citing a conflict of interest
because of his close connection to the police.72
Amidst this politically and racially-charged backdrop, Governor
Rick Scott appointed Jacksonville State Attorney Angela Corey to the
case on March 22nd, the day before President Obama put race at the
forefront of the controversy by famously stating, "If I had a son, he'd
look like Trayvon." 74 In contrast to the President, Corey's first public
statement as lead prosecutor placed the facially neutral stand-your-
ground law at the very center of the case in an ostensible effort to pre-
empt any potential claim that failure to rigorously prosecute Zimmerman
was due to racial bias. She stated to the press on March 26th, "The
stand-your-ground law is one portion of justifiable use of deadly force.
And what that means is that the state must go forward and be able to
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . So it makes the case in
general more difficult than a normal criminal case."" Despite the fairly
nonsensical nature of the statement, given that the state always must
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, Corey's sentiment that stand-
your-ground a priori rendered Zimmerman difficult to prosecute and
convict, stuck.
Little by little, the once-central concerns over racial profiling and
police bias started to fade in the face of a highly partisan and heated
battle for the doctrinal future of self-defense law. While national news
media outlets continued to cover the specific details of the Zimmerman
case, the larger policy discussion nearly exclusively involved the past
by Neighborhood Watchman, ABC NEWs (Mar. 19, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/fbi-justice-
department-investigate-trayvon-martin-killing/story?id=15955985.
71. See Deepti Hajela, Trayvon Martin 'Million Hoodie March' March Draws Hundreds in
New York City, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 21, 2012, 11:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/03/21/trayvon-martin-million-hoodie-march_n_1371403.html.
72. Kevin McVeigh & Amy Green, Trayvon Martin Death: Sanford Police Chief Steps Down
Temporarily, GuARiAN (Mar. 22, 2012, 17:18 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/
mar/22/trayvon-martin-sanford-police-chief-steps-down; Trymaine Lee, Trayvon Martin Case:
State Attorney Quits Investigation as State Studies 'Stand Your Ground' Law, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 22, 2012, 10:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/22/trayvon-martin-state-
attorneyn_1374206.html. The prosecutor had already committed to sending the case to the grand
jury. See McVeigh & Green, supra.
73. See Tim Kephart, Scott Appoints New Prosecutor in Trayvon Martin Case, CBS MIAlN
(Mar. 22, 2012, 9:17 PM), http://miami.cbslocal.com/2012/03/22/scott-appoints-new-prosecutor-
in-trayvon-martin-case/.
74. Krissah Thompson & Scott Wilson, Obama on Trayvon Martin: 'If I Had a Son, He'd
Look Like Trayvon,' WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
obama-if-i-had-a-son-hed-look-like-trayvon/2012/03/23/gIQApKPpVS-story.html.
75. Matt Gutman & Seni Tienabeso, Trayvon Martin Shooter Told Cops Teenager Went for
His Gun, CBS NEws (Mar. 26, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/trayvon-martin-shooter-
teenager-gun/story?id=1 6000239.
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and future of stand-your-ground laws. 6 Many media pundits and talking
heads focused exclusively on whether or not the law tended to unjustly
exonerate truly culpable killers like gang members, repeat offenders, and
drug dealers. 7 In this sense, the anti-stand-your-ground bloc utilized the
familiar racialized tropes of low-class recidivist street-criminals getting
off easy to convince the public that the law is undesirable.78 Commenta-
tors repeated another familiar tough-on-crime discourse, reminiscent of
pro-capital punishment arguments, that lenient murder laws (those with
broad self-defense formulations) predictably correlate with higher homi-
cide rates. Whatever the actual merits of these critiques of stand your
ground, they have little to do with the formerly predominant argument
that stand your ground invested Florida state actors with significant dis-
cretion that they ultimately applied in a racially biased manner.80
As the question of stand your ground's political and utilitarian
desirability increasingly took center stage and the law reform movement
gained momentum, Zimmerman's case moved to trial. The actual trial
was almost anticlimactic from a stand-your-ground perspective. Rela-
tively early, it became clear that the defense did not intend to argue that
Zimmerman could have retreated but instead stood his ground." Rather,
the defense took pains to demonstrate that Zimmerman shot Martin in
the midst of a physical altercation in which Martin was actively assailing
him by smashing his head on the pavement.82 To counter the notion that
Martin was unarmed, attorney Mark O'Mara held up a now-famous
heavy piece of concrete, declaring that this was Martin's weapon and
76. See infra notes 97, 102, 109 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 14, 18, and accompanying text. It is true that some commentators accused
the law of being inherently racist, but they could provide little support outside of the Zimmerman
case itself and some other anecdotes. See, e.g., Nunn, infra note 110.
78. See infra notes 160, 293, and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 14.
80. Consider this comment:
This case is about race because there is every indication that George Zimmerman
would not have followed Martin that night but for his race. . . . It also appears that
the Sanford Police Department did not initially give this case the type of scrutiny it
deserved. It may also be possible that some of the jurors were unable to exclude race
from their consideration. Having said all those things however the outcome of this
case was a result of the law. Moving forward, it is time for a serious examination of
the state of the law of self-defense in this country.
Gary Norton, The Outrage in the Zimmerman Case Is the Law-Not the Judge, Jury, Defense or
Prosecution, DAR.Y Kos (July 15, 2013, 12:46 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/15/
1223870/-The-Outrage-In-The-Zimmerman-Case-Is-The-Law-Not-The-Judge-Jury-Defense-Or-
Prosecution.
81. See CBS News, supra note 20.
82. See Lizette Alvarez, In Zimmerman Case, Self-Defense Was Hard to Topple, N.Y. TMAES,
July 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/us/in-zimmerman-case-self-defense-was-
hard-to-topple.html?pagewanted=al& _=l& (noting that the defense called the case "classic self
defense" and stated that Zimmerman could not retreat).
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calling any suggestion to the contrary "disgusting."" The fraught nature
of the trial had less to do with stand your ground, and much more to do
with prosecutors' lackluster performances and Angela Corey's ex ante
refusal to assert what most found so obvious-that Zimmerman had
unjustly racially profiled Martin. Corey's clear position that Martin's
death and the subsequent events were not evidence of societal and gov-
ernmental racism carried over into her (arguably poor) trial strategy.
And after the acquittal, a smiling Corey declared, "This case has never
been about race."8
In apparent agreement with Corey, many commentators interpreted
the verdict as a product, not of racial bias, but of the inherently undesir-
able stand-your-ground law." Critics clung to the notion that the law
played a central role in the not-guilty verdict rendered by the jury of 5
white and 1 minority women. The jury instructions on self-defense did
mention the stand-your-ground provision, and some of the jurors made
oblique references to the principle in explaining the verdict. However, it
appears that the jurors neither distinguished stand your ground from
classic self-defense nor actually thought Zimmerman could have
retreated. 8  Accordingly, to the extent that the stand-your-ground law
affected juror motivations, it was surely not the legal meaning of the law
regarding retreat, but rather the cultural meaning that stand-your-ground
83. See Lizette Alvarez, Zimmerman Case Goes to Jury, with Defense Urging it to Remove
Emotion, N.Y. Tuyms, July 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/13/us/zimmerman-trial.
html.
84. See infra note 85; see also Lisa Bloom, Op.-Ed., Zimmerman Prosecutors Duck the Race
Issue, N.Y. TuAEs (July 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/opinion/zimmerman-
prosecutors-duck-the-race-issue.html?pagewanted=all (noting that prosecutors never inquired as
to why the defense said Martin "did match" the description of the robbers in the neighborhood
without mentioning that the "match" was only that Martin was a black male, and that prosecutors
did not mention Zimmerman's previous 911 calls about suspicious African Americans).
85. The judge did not permit prosecutors to say that Zimmerman had "racially" profiled
Martin, but allowed them to claim he "profiled" Martin. In any case, prosecutors signaled their
intention not to claim Martin had been racially profiled. See Manuel Roig-Franzia, George
Zimmerman Trial: Race Is a Subtext, Not the Focus, WASH. POST (July 2, 2013), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/national/george-zimmerman-trial-race-is-a-subtext-not-the-focus/2013/07/
02/a29661 le-e262-1 le2-al le-c2ea876a8f30 story.htm1.
86. Bloom, supra note 84.
87. See Mark Follman & Lauren Williams, Actually, Stand Your Ground Played a Major Role
in the Trayvon Martin Case, MOTHER JONES (July 19, 2012, 2:00 AM), http://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/07/stand-your-ground-george-zimmerman-trayvon-martin.
88. See infra notes 165, 176, and accompanying text. Juror B-37 stated she acquitted
"because of the heat of the moment and the stand your ground. He had a right to defend himself. If
he felt threatened that his life was going to be taken away from him or he was going to have
bodily harm, he had a right." Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, Exclusive Interview With Juror B-
37; Defense Team Reacts to Juror Interview, CNN (July 15, 2013), http://transcripts.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/1307/15/acd.01 .html [hereinafter Juror B-37 Interview].
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generally makes it difficult to convict anyone who claims self-defense.89
Perhaps the jurors picked up on this cultural meaning because they were
privy to the 2005 debates in which stand-your-ground critics predicted
apocalyptic results from the legal change. 0 More likely, the jurors inter-
nalized the media commentary in the aftermath of the Martin shooting,
in which stand-your-ground opponents and legal pundits decried the law
as a shooting free-for-all." Consequently, there is some irony in the fact
that the sensational arguments intended to convince the public to con-
demn stand your ground may have constructed a cultural meaning of
stand your ground that makes the law more likely to produce the very
dystopia its opponents hope to prevent.
Today, six months after the verdict, the Trayvon Martin shooting is
no longer front-page news. Zimmerman has cropped up in the media
because of various post-verdict accusations of violent behavior.9 2 These
reports serve to confirm critics' notion that the stand-your-ground law
served to exonerate yet another unstable murderer." Currently, however,
there is little talk of racial profiling and police and prosecutors bias in
the Zimmerman case.94 But stand-your-ground continues to appear in
national news on a regular basis, and the cultural meaning becomes ever
more expansive.9 5 Critics decry stand your ground as the reason for the
hung-jury on the murder count in the Michael Dunn ("thug" music)
case.96 Pundits fret over the possibility that Florida's "popcorn shooter"
89. See Herbanreleaf, 5 Myths About Stand Your Ground Debunked, DAnLY Kos (July 17,
2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/17/1224515/-5-Myths-about-Stand-
Your-Ground-Debunked.
90. One of the more interesting news tidbits is that after the law's passage, the Brady
Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence issued a brochure warning tourists that Florida was a
dangerous place because the stand-your-ground law escalates arguments into homicides. See Abby
Goodnough, Tourists to Florida Get a Warning as Greeting, N.Y. TnIMs (Oct. 4, 2005), http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/10/04/nationallnationalspecial/04shoot.html.
91. See, e.g., supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Doug Stanglin et al., Zimmerman Accused of Pointing Shotgun at Girfriend,
USA TODAY (Nov. 18, 2013, 11:54 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/l1 /
18/zimmerman-trayvon-arrested/3628591/.
93. See, e.g., Dale Archer, George Zimmerman Is Arrested Again, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (NOV.
21, 2013), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/reading-between-the-headlines/201311/george-
zimmerman-is-arrested-again (calling Zimmerman "unstable" and a "ticking time bomb").
94. My unscientific Westlaw news survey, consisting of typing "Zimmerman or Trayvon /p
(within paragraph) racial-profiling" revealed only 28 news reports on the issue from January 4th
to February 4th, 2014, many of which dealt with a prospective boxing match between Zimmerman
and the Game. A search in that same period for stand your ground uncovered over 400 news
articles.
95. Id.; see also Janell Ross, Activists Battling 'Stand Your Ground' State by State, THE RooT
(Nov. 11, 2013, 12:30 AM), http://www.theroot.com/articles/politics/2013/11/stand-your-
groundbattles-are.stateby.state.html (calling stand your ground "globally infamous").
96. See, e.g., Lisa Bloom, 4 Reasons Why Stand Your Ground Made a Difference in the
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will successfully plead stand your ground.97 New studies crop up every
few weeks seeking to determine whether eliminating the duty to retreat
increases the number of homicides or the percentage of justified homi-
cides. 98 Stand your ground comes up routinely in the news, but the pub-
lic discussion is relatively unmoored from race.99
The NAACP dubbed Trayvon Martin this generation's Emmett
Till, and the comparison appears apt.100 Both youths were racially pro-
filed; both ended up dead; and the killers benefitted from racial bias in
the administration of criminal justice.101 Imagine, however, if the legacy
of the Till tragedy were a set of arguments for mandating the death pen-
alty, restricting jury and grand jury rights, and tempering double jeop-
ardy, because these doctrines contributed to the killers Bryant and
Milam's ability to avoid punishment. Rather, the actual lesson of the Till
tragedy is not that criminal laws were generally too lenient on culpable
murderers, but that the widespread existence of racism made it impossi-
ble for black victims (and defendants) to receive justice even under
facially neutral laws. Consequently, there is a distinct "post-racial" turn
in the analysis of the Martin case, given that the critical consensus seems
to be that Martin's death and Zimmerman's acquittal are primarily prod-
ucts of overly permissive murder laws and less so of deeply entrenched
Michael Dunn Trial, THE HUFFINGTON POST (February 21, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
lisa-bloom/four-reasons-why-stand-yo b_..4821223.html.
97. See, e.g., Melanie Michael, Popcorn Defense: Can Accused Florida Movie Shooter Use
'Stand Your Ground'?, KSDK (Jan. 15, 2014, 8:10 AM), http://www.ksdk.com/story/news/nation/
2014/01/15/popcorn-defense-can-accused-florida-movie-shooter-use-stand-your-ground/4488939/
(discussing applicability of stand your ground in case where retired police officer shot fellow
movie-goer who threw popcom at him).
98. See, e.g., NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE ET AL., SHOOT FIRST: 'STAND YoUR GROUND' LAWS
AND THEIR EFFECT ON VIOLENT CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 6, 9 (SEPr. 2013)
available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/images/ShootFirstv4.
pdf; Cheng Cheng & Mark Hoekstra, Does Strengthening Self-Defense Law Deter Crime or
Escalate Violence?, 48 J. HuM. RESOURCEs 821, 823, 844 (2013), available at http:l/
econweb.tamu.edulmhoekstra/castledoctrine.pdf; Anton Strezhnev, Some More Evidence that
Florida's 'Stand Your Ground' Law Increased Firearm Homicide Rates, CASUAL LOOP BLOG
(July 16, 2013, 3:29 PM), http://causalloop.blogspot.nl/2013/07/some-more-evidence-that-
floridas-stand.html.
99. See, e.g., Jeff Weiner & Arelis R. Herndndez, Another 'Stand Your Ground' Case?
MetroWest Shooting Suspect Claims He Was Attacked, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 17, 2014), http://
articles.orlandosentinel.com/2014-01-17/news/os-metrowest-shooting-stand-your-ground-
20140117ltrayvon-martin-apartment-complex-metrowest; Charlotte Alter, Florida Man Who
Killed Teen Over Loud Music Dispute Due in Court, TIME (Feb. 3, 2014) http://nation.time.com/
2014/02/03/stand-your-ground-michael-dunn-jordan-davis-killing-loud-music/#ixzz2sOUvfjlH.
100. See NAACP Calls for Federal Action, NPR (July 14, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=202011023.
101. Keith A. Beauchamp, Emmett Till, Trayvon Martin and the Resurgence of Injustice,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2012, 8:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/keith-a-beauchamp/
trayvon-martin-emmitt-till_b_1453854.html.
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racial hierarchy.'0 2
PART 11: THE INGREDIENTS OF A RACIAL TRAGEDY
In terms of criminal law equity, repealing stand your ground is one-
sided: It benefits prosecutors. It seems obvious that without stand your
ground, it is easier to gain murder convictions, which is why such laws
are widely disfavored by police and prosecutors."o3 In this age of mass
incarceration, an era in which prosecutorial power falls most heavily on
the shoulders of young black men,104 it is interesting that the issue from
the Zimmerman case now eclipsing all others is the one publicized pri-
marily by the prosecutor: Stand your ground makes it too difficult to
arrest and prosecute people for murder. All the other issues brought up
by the disturbing case cut both ways. Condemning racial profiling may
serve to disadvantage the few defendants whose crime involved racial
profiling. For the most part, however, reducing profiling will benefit
minority defendants and suspects unfairly targeted by police.'o" Control-
ling bias in police and prosecutor decision making might burden certain
white defendants who benefit from such bias; however, it would undeni-
ably benefit minority defendants who, at this moment, bear the brunt of
the punitive impulses of state actors.' 0 6 Reforming Florida's six-person
felony jury system could hurt defendants in the rare case where the
102. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
103. See John F. Timoney, Op-Ed., Florida's Disastrous Self-Defense Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/24/opinion/floridas-disastrous-self-defense-law.html
(stating that he as a former Miami Police Chief "along with other Florida chiefs of police" wrote a
letter to the Florida legislature in 2005 opposing stand your ground); Editorial, More 'Stand Your
Ground' Fantasizing, N.Y. TIMES, November 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/l1/24/
opinion/sunday/more-stand-your-ground-fantasizing.html?_r=0 (noting that Ohio police
organizations "strongly oppose" stand your ground); Lizette Alvarez, A Florida Low Gets Scrutiny
After a Teenager's Killing, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/21/us/
justice-department-opens-inquiry-in-killing-of-trayvon-martin.html?_r-0 (discussing Florida's
prosecutors' widespread opposition to the law and quoting the president of the Florida Prosecuting
Attorneys Association as criticizing stand your ground as "a very broad law in terms of the
availability of the defendant to try to take advantage of [it]").
104. See PAUL BUTLER, Lir's GiT FREE: A Hip-Hop THEORY OF JUSTICE 40-61 (2009)
(problematizing mass incarceration).
105. See Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing
research demonstrating that "consistently, across the most policy-relevant and frequent crime
categories, that racial composition predicts stop patterns over and above any predictions made by
crime or other factors" (citations omitted)).
106. See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity:
Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 7 (2013)
(conducting empirical analysis and stating that "research shows that after controlling for the arrest
offense, criminal history, and other prior characteristics, there remains a black-white sentence-
length gap of about 10%. But judges' choices do not appear to be principally responsible. Instead,
between half and the entire gap can be explained by the prosecutor's initial charging decision-
specifically, the decision to bring a charge carrying a 'mandatory minimum."').
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majority of the six jurors happened to be pro-defense.' Nevertheless,
one might expect that the minority juror voices silenced in a six-person
jury are more prone to be minority-friendlyos and defense-friendly
voices." In myopically focusing on stand your ground, some progres-
sive commentators prioritized a subject that solely puts a negative spot-
light on leniency over topics that challenge racial hierarchy and state
criminal authority.
This Section provides a non-exhaustive list of problematic legal
and social conditions contributing to the Martin tragedy. Because a com-
prehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, it will only intro-
duce the issues with the dual goals of generating a fuller discussion and
providing insight on how the punitive impulse demotes progressive radi-
cal concerns. Here, I am not claiming that stand your ground played no
role in the tragedy.1 0 Rather, I assert that analysts may overstate the
law's causal connection to the upsetting series of events and understate
other contributors. It is distinctly possible that Zimmerman was aware of
the specific stand-your-ground law, given his status as a "wannabe cop"
who had taken courses covering Florida's self-defense law, and that the
law motivated his decision to stalk and ultimately kill Martin."' It may
also be the case that the police and prosecutors' apparent restraint and
the jury's ultimate verdict were conditioned, at least in part, by stand
your ground, as discussed in the previous section." 2 Nevertheless, one
could easily imagine the case's series of events taking place in the exact
same manner (save for Corey's deliberate citation of stand your ground
as racial cover), even if Florida law had retained the duty to retreat.
107. See infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional
history of the six-person jury.
108. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 242 (1978) (observing in small juries "[n]ot only is
the representation of racial minorities threatened ... but also majority attitude or various minority
positions may be misconstrued or misapplied by the smaller groups").
109. Id. at 234 (citing studies that the risk of convicting an innocent person increases when
jury size decreases and the risk of not convicting a guilty person increases when jury size
increases).
110. Cf Kenneth Nunn, Op-Ed., Racism Is the Problem Here, N.Y. TUEs (Mar. 21, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/03/21/do-stand-your-ground-laws-encourage-
vigilantes/racism-is-the-problem-not-the-stand-your-ground-laws ("Simply eliminating Stand
Your Ground . .. would not prevent young men like Trayvon Martin from getting killed and their
killers getting off scot-free.").
111. See Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Studied 'Stand Your Ground' in Class, Florida Court Is
Told, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/20l3/07/04/us/witnesses-tell-of-
zimmermans-interest-in-law-enforcement.html (reporting that although Zimmerman told the press
he had never heard of the law, he received an A in a course covering stand your-ground); Richard
Luscombe, George Zimmerman: A Wannabe Cop 'Sick and Tired' of Criminals, Court Hears,
GUARDIAN (July 12, 2013, 3:02 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/12/george-
zimmerman-trayvon-martin-murder-trial.
112. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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Consequently, stand your ground is only part of the story, and we ought
to be circumspect about the missing aspects of the tale.
A. Neighborhood Watches
An anti-neighborhood-watch movement never gained traction with
critics of the Zimmerman case. Interestingly, Florida's history with "citi-
zen patrols" is actually far more racially fraught than its history with
self-defense principles."' Although Zimmerman's Twin Lakes neigh-
borhood watch bore little resemblance to the segregationist citizen
patrols of old, Trayvon Martin's death can be seen as a direct product of
a very racialized "neighborhood watch mentality." This mentality con-
ceives of neighborhoods as fortified castles to be defended from outside
invaders and is intimately intertwined with exaggerated fear of crime,
racial profiling, increased securitization, and state authoritarianism." 4
There is some nascent discussion of the neighborhood watch process
stemming from the Zimmerman case."' 5 This discussion, however, does
not involve critiquing the neighborhood watch mentality, so much as
discussing the ways in which Zimmerman violated neighborhood watch
protocol by being armed and confronting Trayvon Martin.' 16 Critics fur-
ther assert that doctrines like stand your ground convert neighborhood
watchers from proper police-controlled sentries into undesirable
113. See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 337 (1991) (discussing the 1825 Florida
statute "An Act to Govern Patrols" which "provided that white citizen patrols 'shall enter into all
negro houses and suspected places, and search for arms and other offensive or improper weapons,
and may lawfully seize and take away all such arms . . ."') (internal citations omitted). Indeed
citizen patrols were instituted to enforce all the aspects of the "slave codes." Later, in Florida and
elsewhere, citizen patrols enforced racial segregation. See Werner J. Einstadter, Citizen Patrols:
Prevention or Control?, 22 CRIME & Soc. JusT., 200, 202 (1984) (noting that the white citizen
patrols that grew out of the 1960s urban riots were formed with the purpose of "keeping blacks in
place").
114. This is not unlike the "defended neighborhood" idea. "The defended neighborhood is a
product of an urban environment, and a response to the fear of invasion by other ethnic, racial,
and/or economic groups." JUDITH N. DESANA, PROTECTING ONE'S TURF 12 (2005). See generally
GERALD SuTTLES, THE DEFENDED NEIGHBORHOOD (1972).
115. See, e.g., Campbell Robertson & John Schwartz, Shooting Focuses Attention on a
Program That Seeks to Avoid Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
03/23/us/trayvon-martin-death-spotlights-neighborhood-watch-groups.html?pagewanted=1&_r=).
116. See id. (quoting the Sanford Police Department's volunteer coordinator as stating that the
problem was that Zimmerman "didn't follow the basic philosophy of the neighborhood watch");
Soumya Karlamangla, City Where Trayvon Martin Was Killed Changes Neighborhood Watch
Rules, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/02/nation/la-na-sanford-
neighborhood-watch-20131103 ("Chris Tutko, who retired in June as director of national
neighborhood watch for the National Sheriffs' Assn., said a volunteer is merely supposed to be the
eyes and the ears of the police department. The association recommends that neighborhood
watches be unarmed.").
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vigilantes. "
By focusing on how Zimmerman, emboldened by stand your
ground, strayed from neighborhood watch protocol, critics have lost
sight of the fact that, in many ways, Zimmerman was a prototypical
neighborhood watch captain. The neighborhood watch mentality rests on
a set of ideas about criminal risk and prevention, to which Zimmerman
clearly subscribed. The risk idea involves the notion that probability of
crime is always extremely high and utmost vigilance is required." 8 This
notion is not necessarily based on any systematic study of conditions,
but rather on anecdote, racialized paranoia, and a socially embedded
feeling that crime is omnipresent." 9 Indeed, Zimmerman's beliefs about
ubiquitous criminal risk were easily confirmed by the recent break-ins in
his neighborhood.' 20 The prevention idea involves confidence that one
may prevent crime through the random monitoring of outsiders.12'
117. See Robertson & Schwartz, supra note 115.
118. David Garland describes neighborhood watches as one of the many "low-level
adaptations" private citizens make in the face of fear of crime. Others include gated communities,
enclosed malls, private security, and private transportation. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 161-63. One Twin Lakes
resident characterized the state of the neighborhood before the shooting:
There was definitely a sense of fear in the neighborhood after all of this started
happening, and it just kept on happening. It wasn't just a one-time thing. It was
every week. Our next-door neighbor actually said if someone came into his yard he
would shoot him. If someone came into his house he would shoot him. Everyone
felt afraid and scared.
Amy Green, Zimmerman's Twin Lakes Community Was on Edge Before Trayvon Shooting, DAILY
BEAST, (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/28/zimmerman-s-twin-
lakes-community-was-on-edge-before-trayvon-shooting.html.
119. Vanessa Barker observes that in latter twentieth-century America:
Fear of crime, real and imagined, spurred on in part by the spread of 24/7 news
programming and by the politicization of crime, intensified concerns with safety and
law and order, changing the character of social life and filling the landscape with
surveillance cameras, car alarms, private security guards, neighborhood watch
programs, gated communities, and metal detectors in schools and government
buildings. Americans created their own "defensible space," protecting themselves,
their loved ones, and their possessions against crime and violence and demanding
harsh punishment against anyone who violated the law.
Explaining the Great American Crime Decline: A Review of Blumstein and Wallman, Goldberger
and Rosenfeld, and Zimring, 35 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 489, 494 (2010) (citations omitted).
120. Community members in Twin Lakes formed the neighborhood watch after several
burglaries, which then engendered "street knowledge" of even more incidents of burglary and
vandalism. See Chris Francescani, George Zimmerman: Prelude to a Shooting, REUTERS,
Apr. 25, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/25/us-usa-florida-shooting-
zimmerman-idUSBRE83018H20120425. Indeed, studies show that the advent of community
watch groups might actually heighten rather than allay fears of crime. See Dennis P. Rosenbaum,
The Theory and Research Behind Neighborhood Watch: Is It a Sound Fear and Crime Reduction
Strategy?, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 103, 109-111 (1987).
121. The first page of the neighborhood watch manual handed out in Twin Lakes displays a
logo, emblazoned with an eye, reading, "Warning - all suspicious persons and activities are
immediately reported to the Sanford Police Department" and states "Looking out for each other."
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Those who participate in neighborhood watches are engaged in the busi-
ness of monitoring the "suspicious." Although one might hope that the
suspicious means people who are engaged in criminal-like activity, the
reality is that many find individuals of certain races and classes suspect
regardless of what they are doing.'2 2 In fact, many neighborhood watch-
ers would regard an unknown young black male as suspicious because
he is doing nothing.123 This idea of policing through monitoring suspi-
cious characters has driven some of the more questionable on-the-street
policing tactics over the past few decades.124 The statistical analysis
emerging from the recent New York City stop-and-frisk litigation dem-
onstrates that policing through inchoate suspicion is not only racially
fraught, but also ineffective policy. 125
The problematic risk and prevention assumptions endemic to the
neighborhood watch mentality are ripe for progressive criticism. The
notion of perpetual risk has fueled the exponential rise in criminal liabil-
ity and punishment, which in turn has led to our present state of hyper-
incarceration.126 Professor Jonathan Simon has argued eloquently that
the criminal risk notion has elevated criminal law to a new form of gov-
ernance that regulates the lives of both potential criminals and potential
victims (i.e. everyone). He states:
If we truly consider all the ways that the problem of crime oper-
See Figure 1. Stanford Police Department Neighborhood Watch: Neighborhood Watch Program-
SPDPowerPoint, fig. 1 GEORGE ZIMMERMAN TRAYVON MARTIN MURDER CASE BLOG, available at
http://trayvonmartinmurdercase.blogspot.com/p/sanford-police-department-neighborhood.html#.
Uuq6vrHn IU (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Sandford Police Neighborhood Watch
Manual].
122. See Rosenbaum, supra note 120, at 122 (finding that "efforts to 'watch' for 'suspicious
strangers' may become synonymous with watching for blacks or Hispanics"); see also infra
Figure 2, Stanford Police Department Neighborhood Watch Manual, supra note 121; see also
infra Figure 3, Stanford Police Department Neighborhood Watch Manual, supra note 121.
123. See generally L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion
Heuristic, 98 IoWA L. REv. 293, 302-16 (2012) (discussing how race operates as a "suspicion
heuristic" and citing multiple studies linking race and perceptions of criminality); cf Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 47 (1999) (discussing anti-gang statute that allowed for police intervention
into "loitering," defined as having "no apparent purpose").
124. This occurs both in the traffic stop context, Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic
Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 425, 425 (1997); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All
Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Perpetual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 544, 546, 569-570 (1997), and the stop-and-frisk context. See Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 225-226, 237-241 (1983); Randall
S. Susskind, Race, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, and Seizure, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 327,
332, 334-338 (1994).
125. See supra note 104.
126. See Frank 0. Bowman, m, Murder, Meth, Mammon, and Moral Values: The Political
Landscape of American Sentencing Reform, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 495, 497-98, 507 (2005) (stating
that "our experiment in mass incarceration" is in part driven by "fear of crime and social disorder"
and "timidity is excessive fear, an unwillingness to bear up against even the ordinary and
avoidable risks of life and human society").
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ates as the occasion and rationale for governance, we must include
the millions of others who live in environments and routines shaped
by fear of crime. This involves more than simply the widening of nets
in our efforts to control criminal behavior. Indeed, by far the larger
portion of people actively governed by crime are not criminal-law
violators but persons affirmatively seeking to protect themselves and
their families from crime....
... The growth of incarceration and of "target hardened" resi-
dential communities has exacerbated racial tensions and rolled back
many of the gains of the civil-rights revolution. In poor and minority
communities that experience the highest rates of incarceration, the
removal of large numbers of adult males from the community threat-
ens the formation of families and the reproduction of informal social
order, and it may actually impede the ability of those communities to
informally control crime. The securitization of American cities and
suburbs has contributed to a number of social problems including
sprawl, traffic congestion, desertion of public spaces and institutions,
and a national epidemic in childhood obesity exacerbated by the vir-
tual imprisonment of both poor and privileged children in the name
of keeping them safer.' 2 7
Thus, through leveraging the fear of crime, politicians have convinced
the public to participate in legal regimes that may be largely against their
actual interests in safety and liberty. Nevertheless, castle doctrines, and
especially their modem iteration, stand your ground, can also be criti-
qued as stemming from the risk ideology that we are all besieged by an
omnipresent criminal force.' 28 While this point is well taken and the
origin of these doctrines should be the subject of critical scrutiny, there
is still a significant difference between neighborhood watches and stand
your ground. Neighborhood watches have a primary purpose of profiling
suspicious outsiders. Stand-your-ground law, it turns out, mostly applies
outside the community protection/fear of crime context. The doctrine
aids defendants who have killed in a wide variety of confrontational sit-
uations.12 9 Consequently, although stand your ground certainly
originated from problematic notions of perpetual criminal ubiquity and
racial panic, in operation, the law acts as a general doctrine of leniency.
127. Jonathan Simon, Introduction: Crime, Community, and Criminal Justice, 90 CALIF. L.
REv. 1415, 1416-17 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
128. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text; See Suk, The True Woman, supra note
39, at 259 ("The Castle Doctrine movement is driven by a core image of crime: violent invasion of
the home. It harnesses the powerful intuitive appeal of giving ordinary people greater ability to
protect themselves and their families from crime.") (citations omitted).
129. See fatal cases profiled in Tampa Bay Times' Stand Your Ground Database. Those Who
Stood, Those Who Fell: Fatal Cases, TAMPA BAY TIMEs, http://www.tampabay.com/stand-your-
ground-law/fatal-cases (last visited Feb. 6, 2014). The vast majority of cases do not involve the
shooting of suspicious persons.
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The prevention component of neighborhood watch mentality is
equally ripe for scrutiny. Instructing people that it is their neighborly
duty to profile irregular characters operatively creates racial border
patrols. In essence, there is a cultural norm that good community mem-
bers redline their own neighborhoods.o30 Given conscious and uncon-
scious biases, people will naturally target minorities and the poor as
"suspicious," which is hazardous from both an equality and policy per-
spective."' Nevertheless, widespread monitoring (and banishment) of
those who do not belong is an integral part of neighborhood watch
mentality.13 2 George Zimmerman's behavior, up until the confrontation,
was completely consonant with neighborhood watch mentality norms.
He was hypervigilant about crime and felt that crime could be prevented
by closely monitoring suspicious outsiders.
Critics primarily claim that problems occurred only when Zimmer-
man exceeded his authority as an observant private citizen and actually
confronted the suspicious person-a task reserved exclusively to the
police. This criticism, however, reinforces rather than undermines one of
the more disturbing aspects of neighborhood watches. Neighborhood
watches serve to amplify state inquisitorial and authoritarian power by
converting ordinary citizens into invigilators for the police."' Watches
employ private individuals as sentinels, there to engage in profiling
when police cannot.1' But ultimately police are supposed to remain the
actual enforcers of government power. Should progressives concentrate
their disapprobation on private use of force and be unconcerned with a
system in which private citizens profile outsiders and then call in the
state to act upon the profiling? In the Zimmerman case, perhaps he was
130. Robert Weisberg describes a spectrum of communitarian arrangements:
At one extreme, we have from the 1960s Saul Alinsky-type left-wing "community
organizing," which explicitly seeks to create a new sense of community identity in
order to achieve highly specific redistributive goals. But, at the other extreme, we
have racist enclave-protecting crime aimed at solidifying a sense of community, and
somewhere along the continuum we have Not In My Backyard environmental
programs and the subtly exclusionary "Neighborhood Watch" programs.
Restorative Justice and the Danger of "Community", 2003 UTAH L. REV. 343, 373 (citations
omitted).
131. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 112-13, 120, and accompanying text.
133. See Einstadter, supra note 113, at 204 ("The fact remains that [citizen patrols] add to and
often are extensions of existing systems of state control, and as of now they neither replace that
control nor promise to do so in the near future.").
134. STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND
CLASSIFICATION 68-69 (1985) (noting the shift in the United States toward a "formalized type of
enlistment of private citizens into police work" including "a formalization of neighbourhood
surveillance and reporting systems: crime-stoppers groups, neighbourhood patrols, citizen crime-




particularly racist and paranoid and Sanford police officers were
paragons of racial rationality and restraint, such that the outcome would
have been much better had Zimmerman waited for officers to show up.
In general, however, one is left to wonder if police intervention is less
troubling from a racial and social justice standpoint than private behav-
ior. Is it in fact the case that police are less rather than more likely to
resort to force than private citizens? Are they less rather than more apt to
see minorities as suspicious? Do police diffuse rather than foment racial
tension?.In a tiny enclave of Cambridge, Massachusetts, circa 2009, a
concerned neighbor called police about a possible break-in involving a
man who "might be Hispanic" and even speculated that it could be the
resident trying to enter his house. An officer took over from there and
escalated the encounter to the infamous "Gates arrest."' 3 5
Moreover, unlike many private citizens, police are always armed
and have always had the right to stand their ground.136 In the status quo,
police killings of suspects are met with utter impunity.13' Accordingly, it
is plausible that had police shown up, they would not even have waited
for a physical confrontation to shoot. The Amadou Diallo case tells us
that.13 8 Now, perhaps what would really have happened is that police
would not have shown up at all or in time to confront Martin. However,
one cannot justify the operation of the neighborhood watch program by
the assumption that police will not show up. Consequently, critiquing
Zimmerman's use of private force without critiquing the neighborhood
watch context in which he used it serves to confirm the idea that individ-
uals' hypersensitivity to crime and racial border patrolling is acceptable,
so long as it is in service of augmenting the police authority of the state.
135. See generally CHARLES J. OGLETREE, THE PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: THE ARREST OF
HENRY Louis GATES JR. AND RACE, CLASS, AND CRIME IN AMERICA (2010).
136. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 776.05 (2013) ("A law enforcement officer, or any person whom
the officer has summoned or directed to assist him or her, need not retreat or desist from efforts to
make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. The officer is
justified in the use of any force . . . .").
137. See Harris, supra note, at 25 (citing various authorities on police brutality and impunity);
David Packman, 2010 National Police Misconduct Statistics and Reporting Project Police
Misconduct Statistical Report, Draft, CATO INST.'S NAT'L POLICE MISCONDUCT REPORTING
PROJECT (Apr. 5, 2011, 12:55 AM), http://www.policemisconduct.net/2010-npmsrp-police-
misconduct-statistical-report/ (finding that "prosecuting police misconduct in the US is very
problematic with conviction rates, incarceration rates, and the amount of time law enforcement
officers spend behind bars for criminal misconduct are all far lower than what happens when
ordinary citizens face criminal charges").
138. See Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; 4 Oficers in Diallo Shooting Are
Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/26/
nyregion/diallo-verdict-overview-4-officers-diallo-shooting-are-acquitted-all-charges.html;
CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL
COURTROOM 175-78 (2003) (discussing case).
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FIGURE 2: SLIDE FROM SANFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT
NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH POWERPOINT
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FIGURE 3: PAGE FROM STANFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT
NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH BURGLARY PREVENTION PAMPHLET
* Burglars target homes that look deserted.
I. Make your house look like someone may be home.
2. Leave a radio or TV on when you leave.
3. Leave lights on if you won't be home before dark, or have
lights on timers to turn on at dark.
4. Open drapes.
A. Have a trusted neighbor (relative) take in your daily mail and newspapers.
B. If you leave for a weekend or a few days, leave your 2" car in the driveway, or
ask a neighbor to park theirs in your driveway while you are gone.
* Don't feel that you have to open the door to anyone who knocks. If you didn't invite them,
you don't have to open the door.
1. Ask who it is before you answer the door.
* If someone wants to use your phone, make the call for them, don't let them in.
* Install window glazing for vulnerable areas like glass next to doors or glass doors.
* Call right away when you see suspicious people,
vehicles or activity...don't wait an hour to do so.
Report suspicious persons...
activities ... ... or vehicles.
B. Racial Profiling
The foregoing Section segues naturally to a discussion of racial
profiling. Next to the stand-your-ground issue, the racial profiling issue
received the most media and expert attention.139 The studies confirming
current Americans' cultural adherence to the black male-as-criminal
139. See supra notes 9, 80, and accompanying text.
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stereotype, whether consciously or unconsciously, are so numerous as to
be almost banal to the criminal law scholar. 14 0 And yet many, if not a
majority of, society members still adhere to the prosaic, discredited col-
lection of arguments that deny the existence of racial hierarchy.14 1 One
common assertion, for example, is that Zimmerman's status as an
ethnic-looking Latino makes it impossible for the shooting to be an
instance of racial subordination of African Americans. 14 2 Any student of
140. See generally Richardson & Goff, supra note 123, at 302-04 (studies cited); Jennifer L.
Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004) (overview of studies) ("The stereotype of Black Americans as violent
and criminal has been documented by social psychologists for almost 60 years."). Cynthia Lee
explains:
The Trayvon Martin shooting reminds us that Blacks in general, and young Black
men in particular, are subjects of the "Black-as-Criminal stereotype." This
stereotype links Blacks with violence, dangerousness, and criminality. The existence
of this stereotype has been documented by social psychologists for over half a
century. Not only are individuals more likely to perceive mildly aggressive behavior
as more threatening when performed by a Black person than when performed by a
White person, they are also more likely to see hostility in African American faces
than in White faces. While the Black-as-Criminal stereotype is more likely to be
activated from a young Black male wearing baggy pants, a t-shirt, and a skull cap or
a hoodie, even well-dressed Black men and women have found themselves the
objects of suspicion by taxi drivers who refuse to stop for them; store clerks who
follow their every move; women who, clutching their purses, cross the street to
avoid an imagined possible mugging; and women who avoid getting on the same
elevator with them.
Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial
Society, 91 N.C. L. REv. 1555, 1580-82 (2013) (citations omitted).
141. A July 2013 Poll from the Rasmussen Reports is very telling of the presence of aversive
racism in post-racial ideology. It finds that the majority of Americans believe that blacks are more
likely to be "racist" than whites (37% of American adults believe blacks are racist whereas only
18% believe that whites are racist). More Americans View Blacks as Racist than Whites,
Hispanics, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (July 3, 2013), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public-
content/lifestyle/general_1ifestyle/july_2013/moreamericansviewblacks-as_racistthan_
whiteshispanics [hereinafter RASMUSSEN REPORTS]. Even among blacks, "31% think most blacks
are racist, while 24% consider most whites racist." Id. Rasmussen polls further reveal that most
Americans believe that the economy is fair to women, blacks, Latinos, and the poor and that it
treats these groups better than the middle class. Id. Finally, most Americans believe that
affirmative action discriminates against whites. Id.
142. See Arelis R. Hernindez, Trayvon-Zimmerman Tragedy Shows Labels Don't Fit When It
Comes to Race, Ethnicity, ORLANDo SENTINEL (Oct. 13, 2012, 7:18 PM), http://
articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-10-13/news/os-trayvon-george-zimmerman-hispanic-identity-
20121013_Iltrayvon-martin-investigator-chris-serino-george-michael-zimmerman (observing
that the revelation of Zimmerman's "ethnic" identity made the case for many, "a different story
devoid of any racial undertones: Zimmerman himself was a minority, they reasoned, so he
couldn't possibly be racist or hold prejudices against other minorities"); Trayvon Martin:
Confusion over Zimmerman Highlights Changing Discourse on Race and Latinos, Fox NEWS
LATINO (Mar. 29, 2012), http://latino.foxnews.comlatino/news/2012/03/29/trayvon-martin-
confusion-over-zimmerman-highlights-changing-discourse-on-race [hereinafter Confision]
(quoting a right wing news blogger as tweeting, "I'm actually happy that George Zimmerman is
Hispanic so the usual white people are all guilty by virtue of their skin color stuff won't work").
See also Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice
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race relations, however, would easily dismiss the notion that members of
one minority group cannot harbor racial bias against another minority
group. 14 3 Moreover, the black male-as-criminal stereotype is so utterly
"entrenched and ubiquitous" 1" that individuals of all ethnicities, espe-
cially individuals particularly concerned about crime, internalize it to
some extent.14 5 Another popular anti-color-consciousness argument is
that Zimmerman would have confronted Trayvon even if he had been
white because he was wearing "criminal clothes," namely a hooded
sweatshirt.146 But as respondents note, it strains credulity to believe that
Zimmerman would have profiled any person wearing his or her hood up
in the rain.'4 7 Moreover, to the extent that the hoodie was actually Zim-
in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 852-66 (1997) (discussing how
discrimination law turned a blind eye to color-on-color discrimination).
143. See Confusion, supra note 142 (noting the history of tension between African Americans
and Latinos in Florida); Caroline May, Latino Organizations Dismiss George Zimmerman,
Question His Ethnicity, DAILY CALLER (Mar. 29, 2012, 11:48 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2012/
03/29/latino-organizations-dismiss-george-zimmerman-question-his-ethnicity/#ixzz2s6UDhcaY
(La Raza spokesperson stated, "Is [Zimmerman] Latino? Is he white? Is he both? Who knows?
It's irrelevant. What's relevant are his actions, his racist comments, and his cold-blooded killing of
an innocent young man.").
144. L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV.
2035, 2063-64 (2011).
145. Recent studies of highly racially diverse and majority-minority police departments
demonstrate that, especially for those whose job it is to monitor the suspicious, the tendency to
engage in racial stereotyping can be more of a function of the individuals' work culture and
training than racial difference. See supra note 104 (finding racial profiling in the diverse NYC
Police Department). U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW
ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT 34-39 (Mar. 16, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/
about/spl/nopdjreport.pdf (finding that the majority of minority NOPD officers engaged in
rampant racial profiling of minorities). Cf James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass
Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 36-44 (2012) (discussing
African American support for increased policing, prosecution, and punishment).
146. Bill O'Reilly stated:
The reason Trayvon Martin died is because he looked a certain way, and it wasn't
based on skin color. If Trayvon Martin had been wearing a jacket ... and a tie,.. . I
don't think George Zimmerman would've had any problem. But he was wearing a
hoodie, and he looked a certain way, and that way is how gangstas look. And
therefore he got attention.
Bill O'Reilly: Trayvon Martin Died Because He 'Looked A Certain Way' (VIDEO), HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 14, 2013, 10:30 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/14/bill-oreilly-
trayvon-martinn_3926484.html. Recall also Geraldo Rivera's highly controversial statements
that minority parents should not let their "dark-skinned" children out wearing hoodies and baggy
pants because people will think they are criminals. See Katherine Fung, Geraldo Rivera: Trayvon
Martin's 'Hoodie Is as Much Responsible For [His] Death as George Zimmerman' (VIDEO),
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 23, 3012, 10:22 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/23/
geraldo-rivera-trayvon-martin-hoodie n_1375080.html.
147. Even President Obama, normally reticent on race, noted frustration in the face of the
racial "context" of the shooting being denied and noted the "sense that if a white male teen was
involved in the same kind of scenario, that from top to bottom, both the outcome and the aftermath
might've been different." See Will Allen, Obama: If Trayvon Had Been White, 'Both the Outcome
and the Aftermath Might've Been Different,' NAT'L REv. ONLINE (July 19, 2013, 2:26 PM), http://
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merman's basis for suspicion, clothing can itself be racialized as some-
thing that young black men (i.e. "criminals") wear.14 8 Furthermore,
individuals tend to interpret the meaning of things like clothing through
a racial prism (i.e. a black man in ratty clothing is a drug dealer/criminal
and a black man in fancy clothing is a drug dealer/criminal). 14 9 Conse-
quently, even though racial profiling is already squarely on the radar
screen of every progressive academic and activist, the issue cannot
receive too much attention, given the resilience of aversive racism15 0
and color-muteness15 in our current post-racial era.152
For our purposes, the question is whether the intense attention to
stand your ground shed a spotlight on racial profiling or detracted from
the issue. Both are plausible scenarios and at least partly true. Focusing
on stand your ground might bring to light other cases in which people
who racially profiled and killed minorities were unfairly exonerated. 53
Moreover, critiquing the proponents of stand your ground serves to
undermine the credibility of conservative policy makers who are likely
to deny the existence of racial profiling. 154 In this sense, highlighting
stand your ground furthers anti-racial-profiling interests. However, this
www.nationalreview.com/comer/353926/obama-if-trayvon-had-been-white-both-outcome-and-
aftermath-mightve-been-different-will.
148. Thus, clothing associated with young black men may trigger a prejudicial reaction
regardless of the race of the wearer. A similar phenomenon has been observed when it comes to
black sounding names. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94
Am. EcON. REv. 991, 992-93 (2004); cf Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black
Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701 701 (2001) (discussing "identity performance").
149. See Ronald Weitzer, Racialized Policing: Residents' Perceptions in Three
Neighborhoods, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 129, 140 (2000) (noting that "research suggests that police
tend to view [clothing, jewelry, and type of vehicle] through a racial prism-defined differently
depending on a person's race" and citing studies). These arguments were visually represented by
the million hoodie march and T-shirts proclaiming, "I am Trayvon." See supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
150. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 1, 8 (2004) (describing a phenomenon in which self-described
liberal and egalitarian individuals will engage in unconscious discrimination when they can
"rationalize a negative response on the basis of some factor other than race").
151. Social scientist Mica Pollock states, "[m]y concept of colormuteness suggests that rather
than not seeing people in racial terms, people are actively suppressing race labels when talking
about people . . . . [T]hese kinds of deletions are frequently part of an active (though not always
malicious) refusal to describe and analyze uncomfortable orders of racial inequality or power
conflict." Abigail Bucuvalas, When Race Matters: 'Colormuteness' in American Schools, HARv.
GRADUATE SCH. EDUC. NEWS, http://www.gse.harvard.edu/-news/features/pollockl0012003.html.
152. See generally Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REv. 1589, 1600-05 (2009).
153. See, e.g., Sarah Iverson, Beyond 'Stand Your Ground': Florida's Other Racial Profiling
Practices, CENTER Am. PROGRESs (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/
report/2013/10/1 lfl6860/beyond-stand-your-ground-floridas-other-racial-profiling-practices/.
154. See supra notes 8, 22, and accompanying text & infra notes 229-31 and accompanying
text (discussing political alignments on stand your ground).
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is not how much of the stand-your-ground debate has played out. First,
commentators appear to have paid far more attention to the laws' ten-
dency to exonerate the "usual suspects" like repeat offenders, gang
members, and drug dealers, than to whether it encourages frightened or
paranoid citizens to engage in race-based violence.' In fact, as we will
discuss in the next Part, it is unclear whether stand your ground, in itself,
disparately burdens minorities.' 56 More importantly, commentators, per-
haps unwittingly, often situate stand your ground as an alternative
explanation for why Zimmerman shot. Critics of stand your ground reg-
ularly assert that Zimmerman is simply a "hothead" who was
encouraged by the doctrine to shoot at will.' While this may be true or
partially true, an alternative plausible story is that Zimmerman was not
just a trigger-happy guy emboldened by stand your ground. Rather, Zim-
merman was convinced of the necessity to protect his neighborhood
from crime; he was certain that crime-prevention required being armed
and using force; and he was intensely influenced by racialized stereo-
types of criminality. In this light, Zimmerman was not just a deviant
hothead who acted outside of social convention-he was a product of
deeply entrenched norms about crime, security, and race. Arguably,
focusing on stand your ground's ability to encourage hotheads deflects
from larger social questions about race, crime, and community.
Another way in which the stand-your-ground debate detracts from
the racial profiling issue is that it scrutinizes private violence over the
violence of the state. It is undeniable that on occasion, non-state actors
like Zimmerman will engage in private profiling with disastrous results.
When an innocent person is racially targeted and killed, it is a horrific
event, regardless of who pulls the trigger. However, by relentlessly
155. See sources cited supra note 14; see also, e.g., Lou Colagiovanni, Drug Dealer Kills Two
People and Walks away Thanks to 'Stand Your Ground' Law, ExAMINER (Jan. 9, 2014), http://
www.examiner.com/article/drug-dealer-kills-two-people-and-walks-away-thanks-to-stand-your-
ground-law; 15 Shocking Florida Stand Your Ground Cases (PHOTOS), HUFFINGTON POST (July
16, 2013, 3:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/16/stand-your-ground-cases-n
3606405.html; Erin Fuchs, The Florida Stand Your Ground Law Helped Drug Dealers Beat
Murder Charges, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 4, 2012, 1:02 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-
florida-stand-your-ground-law-is-being-used-in-shocking-ways-report-2012-6#ixzz2s7DFFrwR.
156. See infra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 1 ("These laws encourage hotheads to go into potential
confrontations with loaded firearms."); Editorial, Repeal 'Stand Your Ground,' TAMPA BAY TIMES
(June 9, 2012, 5:30 AM), http://www.tampabay.com/opinionleditorials/repeal-stand-your-ground/
1234388 ("'[Sitand your ground"' gives legal cover to hotheads who would escalate a tense
situation and to people who carry weapons."). The day before the verdict, Angela Corey released
the FBI report concluding that the shooting was not race-based and quoting Detective Serino as
stating that Zimmerman had a hero complex but was not racist. See Patrik Jonsson, FBI Report:
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focusing on the stand-you-ground law's encouragement of private force,
critics have lost sight of the fact that Zimmerman initially profiled Mar-
tin in his capacity as a quasi-agent of the state.'"" By condemning only
private force, critics give a pass to those who most often racially profile
and kill minority men-the police.'" If anything, repealing stand your
ground gives more power to police to arrest (and prosecutors to charge)
individuals who have been involved in private confrontations, while
leaving fully intact police's ability to continue to profile and kill those
deemed suspicious.16 0 While thoughtful progressives must condemn
racial profiling and wanton violence, private or official, they should be
careful lest their concentrated scrutiny on private wrongful behavior
serves to normalize police racial profiling and give a monopoly on vio-
lence to the state. 16 1
C. Six-Person Juries
Moving on to the trial phase, several aspects of the proceedings
received critical attention. Commentators highlighted the prosecutors'
deficient performance and their apparent failure to properly prepare
Rachel Jeantel for the trial.' 62 Especially after juror B-37 began speak-
ing to the media, commentators marveled at jurors' identification with
"George," who had not even testified, and some charged the jury with
racial bias. 163 Others, however, gave the jury credit for just following the
158. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. The Sanford Police Department
specifically directed communities to elect neighborhood watch captains to work with them. See
Sandford Police Neighborhood Watch Manual supra note 121.
159. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
160. See Aya Gruber, Neofeminism, 50 Hous. L. REv. 1325, 1379 (2013) ("Emphasizing that
evil individuals cause social problems allows the government to be seen as a white knight using its
prosecutorial powers to stamp out social blight, while otherwise maintaining the attributes of
small government."); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MIcH. L.
Rav. 505, 509 (2001) ("As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and adjudication pass into the
hands of police and prosecutors; law enforcers, not the law, determine who goes to prison and for
how long.").
161. Cf JACQUEs DERRIDA, Force of Law, in Acrs OF RELIGION 230, 266-67 (1990) (noting
that law prohibits private violence to give itself a "monopoly of violence").
162. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Law and Legend: How the Zimmerman Case Was Lost by the
Prosecution, TURLEY BLOG (July 15, 2013), http://jonathanturley.org/2013/07/15/law-and-legend-
how-the-zimmerman-case-was-lost-by-the-prosecution/ (critiquing the prosecution's over-zeal in
charging as a poor performance and calling Jeantel's testimony "a disaster"); Hal Boedeker,
George Zimmerman: Is State Throwing the Case?, ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 3, 2013, 7:51 AM),
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/entertainment/blogs/tv-guy/os-george-zimmermnan-is-state-
throwing-case-20130703,0,3015158.post (noting that TV legal analysts took a generally dim view
of the prosecution's performance).
163. When asked by Anderson Cooper, "[ius George Zimmerman somebody you would like to
have on a neighborhood watch in your community? .. . Is he somebody you would be comfortable
[with]?," B-37 replied, " . . . I think he was frustrated with the whole situation in the
neighborhood, with the break-ins and the robberies. . . . I mean, I would feel comfortable having
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law, given stand your ground and the prosecutorial burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.l" Interestingly, those who believe that race
impermissibly influenced the jury process have not emphasized Flor-
ida's exceptional rule allowing for six-person juries in serious felony
cases.1 65 Even after the lone minority juror, B-29, made statements indi-
cating she may have felt pressure to acquit, the numerical issue never
drew a bright public spotlight. 16 6
Progressives' relative silence on the jury issue is quite surprising,
given that for years liberal scholars have decried the six-person jury sys-
tem as defective from a constitutional and policy perspective. 16 7 In the
George, but I think he's learned a good lesson." Juror B-37 Interview, supra note 88. Based on the
juror's comments that Zimmerman's "heart was in the right place" and explaining Jeantel's
cracker comment as something Trayvon probably said because of "the type of life that they live,
and how they're living, in the environment that they're living in," critics charged her with being
overtly or implicitly racist. See, e.g., Dennis Loo, The Zimmerman Trial Jurors & Invisibility of
Racism, OPEN SALON BLOO (July 21, 2013, 2:36 PM), http://open.salon.com/blog/dennis-loo/
2013/07/21/the-zimmerman _trialjurorsjinvisibility_of-racism; Igor Volsky, 7 Mind Blowing
Moments from Zimmerman Juror B37's First Interview, THINK PROGREss (July 16, 2013, 9:06
AM), http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2013/07/16/2306901/7-mind-blowing-moments-from-
zimmerman-juror-b37s-first-interview/; "These People": The Most Deplorable Moments from
Juror B37's Interview with Anderson Cooper, CLUTCH MAG. (July 16, 2013), http://www.
clutchmagonline.com/2013/07/these-people-the-most-deplorable-moments-from-juror-b37s-
interview-with-anderson-cooper/.
164. See, e.g., Turley, supra note 162; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, On the Zimmerman Jurors,
Am. CONsT. Soc'Y BLOG (July 16, 2013), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/on-the-zimmerman-
jurors (stating that "there was doubt" and that "a jury following its oath to follow the jury
instructions as provided, and holding the government to the burden of proof may have been
correct to acquit").
165. See FLA. STAT. § 913.10 (2013) ("Twelve persons shall constitute a jury to try all capital
cases, and six persons shall constitute a jury to try all other criminal cases.").
166. See Zimmerman Juror: 'My First Vote Was Second-Degree Murder,' ABC NEws (July
26, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/video/george-zimmerman-juror-29-interview-gma-vote-
degree-19779607 ("I was the juror that was going to give them the hung jury. I was. I fought until
the end. . . . I don't know if I was bullied. I trust god that I wasn't bullied, but. . . ."); Earl Ofari
Hutchinson, Why Zimmerman Juror B29 Believed in His Guilt but Still Voted to Acquit,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 28, 2013, 12:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.comlearl-ofari-
hutchinson/why-zimmernan-juror-b29-b-b_3664610.html (analzying reasons why Juror B-29
voted to acquit without discussing the numerical issue); cf Eugene Volokh, The Six-Person Jury
in the Zimmerman Case, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 20, 2013, 5:26 PM), (noting that the six-
person Florida jury system made it more likely to have a jury with an "unusual demographic
mix"); Amy Pavuk, Why Only Six on Florida Juries? Legislature To Push for 12 in Wake of
Zimmerman Verdict, ORLANDo SENTINEL (July 18, 2013), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/
2013-07-18/news/os-jury-size-zimmerman-20130718lLgeorge-zimmerman-trayvon-martin-
benjamin-crump (noting racial critique of six-person jury and the argument "[w]ithout knowing
why a jury made the decision it did, how do you say that your trial was unfair based on the fact
you had a six-person jury?") (internal quotations omitted). It is true that the verdict spawned a
legislative challenge to the Florida jury law, see H.B. 39, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014) (to
make the jury size twelve in all felony cases), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/
2014/0039. But this issue simply did not receive the coverage of the stand-your-ground issue.
167. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text & infra notes 170-73 and accompanying
text.
2014] 995
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
1970 case, Williams v. Florida, a plurality of the Supreme Court, over
vehement dissent, upheld Florida's felony jury system, stating that "the
fact that the jury at common law was composed of precisely 12 is a
historical accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system
and wholly without significance except to mystics."1 68 Although Justice
Burger's Williams opinion declined to state a minimum felony jury com-
position number, he added, "we do not doubt that six is above the mini-
mum." 6 9 Eight years later, in Ballew v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
found that six was actually the bare minimum.170 Relying on empirical
scholarship demonstrating that smaller juries undermine group delibera-
tion, increase the risk of false conviction, are more likely to make erro-
neous judgments, disparately disadvantage the defense, and reduce the
likelihood of representative juries, Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, opined, "the purpose and functioning of the jury in a criminal
trial is seriously impaired, and to a constitutional degree, by a reduction
in size to below six members.""' Since Ballew, civil libertarians and
social scientists have intensely criticized the six-person jury system.172
They contend that such a small jury poses an impermissible risk that
those in the numerical majority will coerce those in the minority or sin-
gle hold-outs to follow the general consensus.173 The argument is that
jurors are already under enormous pressure to reach unanimity, and the
added pressure of being the sole holdout(s) undermines the integrity of
the judicial process. Moreover, this lack of process will generally inure
to the detriment of defendants.174
168. 399 U.S. 78, 102 (1970) (internal quotations omitted). Justice Harlan critiqued the
departure from common law practice, stating, "The only reason I can discern for today's decision
that discards numerous judicial pronouncements and historical precedent that sound constitutional
interpretation would look to as controlling, is the Court's disquietude with the tension between the
jurisprudential consequences wrought by 'incorporation' in Duncan and Baldwin and the counter-
pulls of the situation in Williams which presents the prospect of invalidating the common practice
in the States of providing less than a 12-member jury for the trial of misdemeanor cases." Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 117, 129 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
169. Williams, 399 U.S. at 91 n.28.
170. 435 U.S. 223, 243-245 (1978).
171. Id. at 239, 232-37. But see id. at 246 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Also, I have reservations
as to the wisdom-as well as the necessity-of Mr. Justice Blackmun's heavy reliance on
numerology derived from statistical studies.").
172. See, e.g., Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District
Courts, 60 DuKE L.J. 745, 749 (2010); Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of
the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 517-18 (1997);
Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 Aluz. L.
REv. 849, 897 (1998) (stating that "[s]ocial scientists, who have commented on the issue, appear
unanimous in their opinions that larger juries are superior to smaller juries").
173. See Robert H. Miller, Six of One Is Not a Dozen of the Other: A Reexamination of
Williams v. Florida and the Size of State Criminal Juries, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 621, 671-73 (1998)
(citing studies).
174. See Smith, supra note 172, at 520 ("In criminal trials, six-person juries are more likely to
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There is also a racial critique that smaller juries are more likely to
be ethnically homogenous, thereby undermining the purpose of Batson
v. Kentucky," and disadvantaging racial minorities.17 6 Moreover, when
a racial minority makes it on to the jury, as the lone minority, she may
be subject to extreme pressure from those in the numerical and racial
majority."' The Zimmerman jury seems like the poster child for the
racial and structural problems of six-person juries. Juror B-37, and per-
haps the other white jurors, seemed to relate very well to Zimmerman's
fear of young black Martin. 1 8 They were apparently receptive to Mark
O'Mara's closing strategy of displaying the 8 x 10 photo of a shirtless,
grim-faced Martin and stating, "this is the person . .. who George Zim-
merman encountered that night."' 79 By contrast, the one minority juror
was not so sure.18 0 Juror B-29 said she believed that George Zimmerman
committed murder and was prepared to fight for her beliefs, but she
ultimately felt compelled to vote with the rest of the jury.18 ' Juror B-29,
the sole minority, has since stated that the trial ruined her life.182
convict than twelve-person juries, and the deliberations of twelve-person juries are more likely to
result in a hung jury.").
175. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding the use of racial peremptory strikes unconstitutional).
176. Miller, supra note 173, at 667. See also Higginbotham, supra note 171, at 757
("Numerous studies show a significant increase in minority presence on twelve-person juries as
compared with six-person juries.") (footnote omitted). But see Williams, 399 U.S. at 102 ("As
long as arbitrary exclusions of a particular class from the jury rolls are forbidden, the concern that
the cross-section will be significantly diminished if the jury is decreased in size from 12 to six
seems an unrealistic one.") (internal citation omitted).
177. See Miller, supra note 173, at 668-69 ("Given what is known about the influence of
group-conformity pressure, the presence of a minority juror or minority viewpoint on a jury,
though significantly more likely on a twelve-person jury than on a six-person jury, will be most
influential only if that minority position is joined by an ally.").
178. Juror B-37 stated that all the jurors had no doubt that it was Zimmerman's voice on the
tape. When asked if she believed that Zimmerman felt his life was in danger, she replied, "I really
do." Of the videotaped statements she says, "I think pretty much it happened the way George said
it happened." Finally, when asked whether she believed that the defense's animation of what
happened was what happened, she replied, "I found it credible." See Juror B-37 Interview, supra
note 88. After the interview aired, four jurors distanced themselves from B-37's statements. See 4
Zimmerman Trial Jurors Distance Themselves from Juror B37, CBS NEWS (July 17, 2013, 11:19
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/4-zimmerman-trial-jurors-distance-themselves-from-juror-
b37/.
179. See David Edwards, Zimmerman Lawyer Closes by Showing Jury Shirtless Trayvon
Photo, RAW STORY (July 12, 2013, 12:19 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/07/12/
zimmerman-lawyer-closes-by-showing-jury-shirtless-trayvon-photo; Figure 4, Michael Pearson
& David Mattingly, Gun, Drug Texts Feature in New Trayvon Martin Shooting Evidence, CNN
(May 26, 2013, 1:21 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/23/justice/florida-zimmerman-defense/;
Figure 5, see Edwards, supra.
180. See Juror B-37 Interview, supra note 88. Indeed, studies demonstrate that jurors of
different races react very differently to factual issues, especially issues like police credibility,
suspicious behavior, and the like.
181. See sources cited supra note 165.
182. See Hal Boedeker, George Zimmerman Juror: Trial Ruined My life, ORLANDO SENTINEL
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One might speculate that civil libertarians have not used the Zim-
merman verdict as an occasion to argue for jury reformation because of
their adherence to the value of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
One liberal spin on the verdict is that jurors rightly possessed reasonable
doubt because the prosecution had no theory of the case. 1 8 3 Accordingly,
after the verdict, many pro-defense progressives justified the acquittal as
compelled by constitutional requirements and our country's commitment
to preventing false convictions.184 It would be strange then to turn
around and critique this "correct" verdict by offering it as evidence that
the Florida jury system is broken.'18  However, one could simultaneously
believe that the prosecution failed to meet its burden and believe that the
jury process was irretrievably flawed. If juror B-37 is any indication, the
majority (racial and viewpoint) jurors had a particular vision of the facts,
involving Zimmerman fighting for his life when he shot Martin, which
they apparently believed without reservation.'"' It is plausible that the
majority jurors adopted this vision because they could relate to the
intense fear of young black men and then imposed this racialized vision
of the facts on the lone minority juror."' Likely, a jury of culturally
competent criminal law professors would have also acquitted, given the
lack of proof. Nevertheless, whatever one believes about the ultimate
(Oct. 31, 2013, 11:42 AM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/entertainment/blogs/tv-guy/os-
george-zimmerman-juror-trial-ruined-my-life-20131031,0,7091899.post.
183. See Maurielle Lue, George Zimmerman Acquittal: U of D Mercy Law Professor Reacts,
My Fox DETROIT (July 15, 2013, 9:13 PM), http://www.myfoxdetroit.com/story/22847842/
george-zimmerman-acquital-university-of-detroit-mercy-law-professor-reacts#ixzz2s8rw8SxF
(quoting law professor as attributing the acquittal to the prosecution "never develop[ing] a theory
of their case"); see also supra note 163.
184. See supra note 164; Bill Hoffman, Alan Dershowitz: I Would Find Zimmerman 'Not
Guilty,' NEWS MAX (July 10, 2013, 6:22 AM), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/zimmerman-
martin-trial-defense/2013/07/09/id/514186.
185. Jonathan Turley, for example, argued that the verdict was only an indication that the
jurors had reasonable doubt, stating, "[tihe acquittal does not even mean that the jurors liked
Zimmerman or his actions. It does not even mean they believed Zimmerman. It means that they
could not convict a man based on a presumption of guilt." Turley, supra note 162.
186. See Juror B-37 Interview, supra note 88. Juror B-37 further stated, "I had no doubt
George feared for his life in the situation he was in at the time." Id. In fact, studies show that
jurors do not really understand the concept of reasonable doubt. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Laird C.
Kirkpatrick, A Concept in Search of a Definition: The Effects of Reasonable Doubt Instructions on
Certainty of Guilt Standards and Jury Verdicts, 20 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 655, 664-69 (1996).
187. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race
and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KErr L. REV. 997, 1010
(2003) (performing extensive literature survey and concluding that "substantial evidence exists to
support the conclusion of many legal scholars that, at least under some conditions, White jurors
exhibit racial bias in their verdicts and sentencing decisions"). Indeed, when asked about the one
juror who was not sure that it was Zimmerman's voice screaming for help, Juror B-37 replied,
"[s]he wanted to give everybody an absolute out of being guilty." In this juror's mind, finding
Zimmerman not guilty equated with finding Martin guilty. In essence, Martin also a defendant on
trial.
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verdict, there is evidence that the process by which this "good" verdict
was reached signifies structural and racial problems with Florida's jury
system. Such problems should particularly concern civil libertarians
because they tend to disproportionately burden minority defendants."'
FIGURES 4 & 5: THE DEFENSE' S USE OF PHOTOS OF
TRAYVON MARTIN
188. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
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D. Racialized/Post-Racialized Discretion in Arrest and Prosecution
Finally, we arrive at the issue that most concerned progressive
commentators and race critics in the days following the shooting: the
State's apparently biased handling of the case. Part I discussed exten-
sively the early critique that police and prosecutors exercised undue
restraint because George Zimmerman was a non-black neighborhood
watch captain and Trayvon Martin was a young black man, so the dis-
cussion bears only brief repeating here. 8 9 In the initial days after the
shooting, critics seized on an issue quite familiar to criminal law schol-
ars, namely that the burdens of the American penal system are unevenly
distributed on a racial basis.190 Like the racial profiling issue, numerous
studies and analyses confirm that discretion leads to racial inequality
because blacks often bear the brunt of state actors' punitive tendencies
and whites primarily benefit from state actors sympathetic impulses.191
189. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 103-09.
191. See, e.g., Starr & Rehavi, supra note 106, at 5 (conducting study and finding that racial
disparities in federal sentences "stem largely from prosecutors' charging choices, especially
decisions to charge defendants with 'mandatory minimum' offenses"); Robert J. Smith & Justin
D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 795-97 (2012); ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF
THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5 (2007). In the death-penalty context, prosecutors' discretion has
been linked to dispArities in that those who kill white victims, particularly blacks who kill white
victims, are more likely to receive a death sentence than similarly situated defendants who kill
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The critique of police racism is legion. 19 2 Race and death penalty litiga-
tion, most famously the 1987 case of McCleskey v. Kemp, have put
a spotlight on racial bias in discretionary prosecution. 19 3 Today, many
progressives critique our current web of carceral laws and policies as
"the New Jim Crow."' 9 However, in our post-racial era, when many
Americans cling to the notion that formal equality has been unequivo-
cally achieved, this critique often falls on deaf ears.' 95 A sizable portion
of the public (and the majority of white Americans) believes that crimi-
nal prosecution is an objective, just, and race-neutral way to address
social dysfunction.1 96
Thus, as with the racial profiling issue, progressives should con-
tinue to engage in efforts to spotlight state actors' tendency to exercise
discretion in a racialized manner. The Zimmerman case has proven to be
a legal catalyst, causing the public and lawmakers to rethink their posi-
tions on criminal law and move toward actual changes. Progressives
should use this catalytic moment to put pressure on police departments
and district attorneys' offices to address racial bias.'97 In the early days
of the Zimmerman case, race critics scrutinized the Sanford Police
Department for its handling of the case, which in turn uncovered other
incidents of their racialized policing."' It became clear that media com-
mentators and race scholars were prepared to transfer that scrutiny to the
black victims. See Katherine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of
Prosecutorial Decision-Making in Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIz. L. REV. 305, 360 (2009);
Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor's Perspective: Race of the Discretionary
Actors, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1811, 1814-15, 1819-20 (1998); Isaac Unah, Choosing Those Who
Will Die: The Effect of Race, Gender, and Law in Prosecutorial Decision to Seek the Death
Penalty in Durham County, North Carolina, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 135, 177 (2009); Richard H.
McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CI.-KENT
L. REV. 605, 644 n.120 (1998); Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in
New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27, 327 (1988).
192. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 136-38 and 16.
193. 481 U.S. 279, 326 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The data involved in the case revealed
that the race of the victim in Georgia exerts as much influence on the sentence outcome as
whether the defendant had a prior murder conviction. Brief for Petitioner, McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987) (No. 84-6811), available at 1986 WL 727359, at 88.
194. See supra note 145.
195. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
196. See RASMUSSEN REPORTS, supra note 141 (discussing finding that 45% of Americans
believe the criminal justice system is fair to minorities); Frank Newport, Gulf Grows in Black-
White Views of U.S. Justice System Bias, GALLUP (July 22, 2013), available at http://
www.gallup.comi/poll/I63610/gulf-grows-black-white-views-justice-system-bias.aspx ("While
68% of blacks say the American justice system is biased against blacks, 25% of whites agree.
Blacks' attitudes about the justice system have remained virtually constant over the past 20 years,
but whites have become less likely to perceive bias.").
197. See supra note 143 (discussing bias in Florida criminal system).
198. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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prosecution of the case.' 99 Enter stand your ground. Police Chief Jim
Lee made a half-hearted attempt to argue that the legal requirements of
self-defense and probable cause thwarted the ability of the police to
affect a prompt arrest.2" However, it was the prosecutor, Angela Corey,
who brought the stand-your-ground law, which was already unpopular
with district attorneys, to the forefront as a wedge issue.20 ' We know
that from those early days up until after the trial, Corey sought to
divorce the case from race.2 02 Even though the trial was not yet in its
embryonic stages, Corey's insertion of stand your ground as a wedge
effectively changed the tenor of the discussion, so that in the event of an
acquittal critics would attribute the verdict primarily to prosecutorial
ham-stringing by stand your ground and not to race-based prosecutorial
restraint.203 Consequently, stand your ground was intended to, and
arguably did, silence claims that leniency toward Zimmerman was prin-
cipally a product of racial inequality.2 0
Nevertheless, one might assert that the current focus on stand your
ground includes a focus on whether state actors are applying the doctrine
in a biased manner. In this sense, zeroing in on stand your ground could
lead to discussions about how to reduce racial bias in police and prose-
cutor decision making more generally. Indeed, as will be discussed in
Part III, the emergent studies on the doctrine have uncovered extreme
racial disparities in how police and prosecutors treat potential self-
defense cases, although interestingly they are not necessarily exacer-
bated stand your ground.20 5 Nonetheless, it appears that the stand-your-
ground discussion is more properly understood to diminish rather than
highlight the importance of the race and discretion issue. First, although
there is some discussion of the racialized application of the law, most of
the current national conversation involves the overly permissive nature
of the law.206 Commentators tend to focus on the fact that the law forces
police and prosecutors to go light on culpable killers and encourages
people to kill.2 07 Second, to the extent that race does crop up in the
stand-your-ground discussion, critics tend to assume that the racial
199. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., DeWayne Wickham, Wickham: How Did Zimmerman Become Victim?,
USA TODAY (July 15, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/07/15/
george-zimmerman-trayvon-martin-dewayne-wickham/2515979/ (asserting that stand your ground
"became Zimmerman's get-out-of-jail-free ticket").
205. See infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
1002 [Vol. 68:961
RACE TO INCARCERATE
problems are somehow endemic to the law itself.208 In this view, equal-
ity can be restored though repealing the law, while leaving untouched
the practices that cause that law (and most other criminal laws) to
unequally burden minorities. Accordingly, stand your ground has come
to symbolize racism in the administration of criminal justice, even
though nothing about the law facially calls for a discriminatory result.209
However, in targeting that law, we may actually be ignoring the real
source of discrimination and creating a situation that is worse, not better,
for minorities. Part III below focuses on whether stand your ground is an
obvious or appropriate locus of racial outrage.
PART III: STAND YOUR GROUND'S RACIAL IMPLICATIONS
Media, legal experts, and scholars elevated stand your ground to a
racial symbol of utmost import, such that many now consider the doc-
trine's elimination an unequivocal necessity for racial justice, and con-
versely the doctrine's continued existence a racial justice defeat.2 10 The
last two Parts made the case that the focus on stand your ground may
have deflected attention away from other axes of racial inequality,
namely, the neighborhood watch mentality, the racial profiling of young
black men, the six-person jury system, and racially biased state actor
discretion. In addition, while progressives and critical race scholars con-
tinue to adhere to the notion that the problem with stand your ground is
that it reflects and reinforces racial hierarchy, public commentary has in
a sense de-racialized the law.211 By emphasizing that the law is bad pol-
icy (i.e. too lenient on culpable murderers), some commentators have
de-linked the law from the racially tragic details of Martin's case,
namely that Zimmerman killed him specifically because of a racialized
fear of crime.2 12 Instead, they emphasize nonracial victimization aspects,
namely that Zimmerman was a "hothead" and Martin was an inno-
cent.2 13 Moreover, the stand-your-ground law may not itself be more
208. See Jesse Jackson Files Lawsuit to Repeal Stand Your Ground in Georgia, ATLANTA
DAILY WORLD (Nov. 1, 2013), http://atlantadailyworld.com/2013/11/01/jesse-jackson-files-
lawsuit-to-repeal-stand-your-ground-in-georgia/ ("Critics have said that Florida's stand-your-
ground law was the reason Zimmerman was acquitted on all charges... . [Jesse] Jackson and other
critics say the more lenient laws lead to more violence, particularly against black males like
Martin.").
209. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text; see Bill Cotterell, Florida Stand Your
Ground Law 'Not Repealable,' Says Expert, HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2013, 4:15 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/31/stand-your-ground-repeal-n 3681539.html ("Florida's self-
defense law and the Zimmerman case are seen by many African Americans as emblematic of a
lack of racial equality in the U.S. justice system.").
210. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text
212. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
213. This, in turn, sparked a response on the right that Zimmerman is not a hothead and Martin
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prone to disparate application than any other criminal law principle, and
its repeal may have some racial effects that progressives have not antici-
pated and might not actually want. This Part takes a critical look at the
belief that stand your ground is an inherently racist law, the repeal of
which is required for racial justice. It also questions whether, as a gen-
eral matter, discrimination in the application of doctrines of criminal
leniency should always be addressed through mainstreaming severity.
As noted in Part I, stand-your-ground-like doctrines have been on
the books for well over a century in the United States, but have received
little attention from racial critics.2 14 The doctrine of self-defense, in gen-
eral, has sometimes been the subject of critical race scrutiny. The most
infamous case involving the racialized use of self-defense prior to the
Zimmerman case was the Bernard Goetz case, in which Goetz, the New
York City "subway vigilante," successfully utilized New York's self-
defense law to achieve an acquittal for the admitted execution-style
shooting of four black youths.2 15 The bulk of the critical commentary
involved the defense attorney's explicit and implicit invocation of ste-
reotypes of black male criminality and the malleability of the reasona-
bleness standard.2 16 Regarding the latter, scholars asserted that the
standard invited jurors to apply prevailing racially hierarchical norms to
Goetz's decision making, specifically, the overarching fear of young
black men.217 To be sure, critical race scholars have argued that the "rea-
sonable person" standard is raced and gendered in a variety of legal
was, in fact, not innocent. See Eric Zorn, Op-Ed., Guess What? We're Having a Surmise Party,
CHI. TIUB., at A22 (Apr. 1, 2012) (noting the conservative view that Zimmerman is "a righteous
citizen who's being condemned for defending his life against a hothead"); ProLegs, Limbaugh
Says Zimmerman, Not Trayvon Martin, Is the Real Victim, DAILY KOS (July 3, 2013, 1:37 PM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/03/1220985/-Limbaugh-Says-Zimmerman-Not-Trayvon-
Martin-is-the-Real-Victim.
214. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
215. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 41-43 (N.Y. 1986) (reinstating indictment against
Bernard Goetz, a white man who shot and wounded four black youths on New York City subway
train after one or two of them asked for five dollars, because he claimed they were going to rob
him).
216. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 428
(1988) (asserting that the defense "conjured . . . an image of innocent whiteness surrounded by
threatening blackness"); Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitor: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent
Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 781, 782, 787 (1994); LEE, supra note
138, at 148-54.
217. See Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical
Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation
Cases, 26 AM. J. CRim. L. 1, 88 (1998) ("To many, allowing the reasonableness of Goetz's actions
to be judged in light of his past "victimization" by black youth is tantamount to saying that
individuals should not be legally required to avoid being racist."); Armour, supra note 214, at 790
(contending that "the error the 'Reasonable Racist' makes in claiming that the moral norm implicit
in the objective test of reasonableness extends no further than the proposition that 'blame is
reserved for the (statistically) deviant"'); LEE, supra note 138, at 148.
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areas outside of criminal law, such as torts and contracts.21 8 Accord-
ingly, the Goetz critique is essentially a critique of judge and juror dis-
cretion, stating that flexible reasonableness standards can lead to biased
outcomes.219 In the Goetz case, critics paid far less attention to the duty
to retreat, and the case has never come to stand for the proposition that
New York law should have required retreat.
Over the past several decades, the most vocal progressive critique
of self-defense has involved the notion that the law is too narrow, failing
to accommodate a specific subordinated class of people who kill-bat-
tered women. 220 Feminists have forcefully criticized the law's restrictive
technicalities for disadvantaging female abuse survivors who kill male
batterers. Gender scholars attack the imminence requirement, asserting
that it puts women in danger to require them to wait for the moment or
attack and that it inadequately accounts for the "cycle of violence." 22 1
The duty to retreat has also drawn critical fire. In diametric opposition to
the current progressive position that justice requires preservation of the
duty to retreat, feminist critics called for the abolition or limitation of the
duty in cases involving battered women.222 In an ironic twist, before the
2005 stand-your-ground amendment, the last limitation on Florida's
duty to retreat occurred in 1999, when feminists successfully moved the
Florida Supreme Court in Weiand v. State, a battered woman case, to
218. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146
U. PA. L. REv. 463, 480-89 (1998).
219. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 591, 609 (1981) (asserting that because reasonableness standards allow individual jurors
to "determine whether the particular defendant was reasonable, jury verdicts will be inconsistent,
unpredictable and biased").
220. See, e.g., Michael A. Buda & Teresa L. Butler, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Backdoor
Assault on Domestic Violence, 23 J. FAM. L. 359, 368-78 (1984); Loraine Patricia Eber, Note, The
Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or to Be Killed, 32 HASTINGs L.J. 895 (1981); Cathryn Rosen,
The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who
Kill, 36 Am. U. L. REV. 11, 43 (1986); Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Christine W. Sigman, Reexamining
the Doctrine of Self Defense to Accommodate Battered Women, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 169, 183
(1991); Erich D. Andersen & Anne Read-Andersen, Constitutional Dimensions of the Battered
Woman Syndrome, 53 Omo ST. L.J. 363, 387 (1992).
221. See, e.g., V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. Cm. L. REv. 1235, 1283
(2001); Rosen, supra note 220; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Self-Defense, Domination and the Social
Contract, 57 U. Prrr. L. REV. 579, 605-09 (1996); see also Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors,
Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L.
REv. 211, 229 (2002) ("A battered woman who kills during a non-confrontational moment
encounters two related problems when claiming self-defense-the requirement of imminence and
her failure to leave the relationship.").
222. See, e.g., Judith E. Koons, Gunsmoke and Legal Mirrors: Women Surviving Intimate
Battery and Deadly Legal Doctrines, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 617, 675-76 (2006); see generally Suk, The
True Woman, supra note 39, at 253-59 (tracing doctrinal shifts and noting courts revised the duty
to retreat to allow battered women to "kill in self-defense without retreating because, trapped in
the dynamics of [domestic violence], she lacked the capacity to leave"); Nourse, supra note 221,
at 1280 ("The feminist position has generally been hostile to retreat rules . . . .").
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eliminate the duty retreat before using deadly force against a co-habitant
in the home.2 23
In the end, progressives seek a self-defense law that simultaneously
accommodates sympathetic defendants (battered women who kill abus-
ers, minorities who kill those racially harassing them) and excludes
unsympathetic ones (paranoid individuals who racially profile and kill
minorities). Indeed, had the case played out differently-Zimmerman
attacked Martin, who in the midst of the attack retrieved the gun and
shot Zimmerman, many liberals would be quick to say that Martin did
not have to retreat (or could not have safely retreated) and excoriate the
state for charging Martin with murder. 2 24 However, completely remov-
ing discretion from the law to eliminate disparity, only serves to ensure
that the law treats both minorities and majority individuals unjustly. It is
equally unsatisfying to seek a world in which no one is ever criminally
punished for killing and one in which everyone who kills is mandatorily
subject to capital punishment. So what is a critical commentator to say
when faced with a racial tragedy that the law could not or did not pre-
vent? I assert that it is not enough to simply call for the elimination of
leniency principles because a racial malefactor was able to utilize them.
By the same token, one should not always call for greater doctrinal leni-
ency whenever a defendant sympathetic to progressives is convicted.2 25
Instead, progressives ought to engage in careful factual and analytical
inquiry to determine whether the elimination or addition of a certain
criminal law doctrine furthers racial equality.2 26 Such a determination, in
our current carceral state, necessarily occurs upon a backdrop of the
mass incarceration of minorities.2 27 I would thus propose that when
progressives critically analyze the equities of a certain shift in criminal
law, they do so with the assumption that greater severity in criminal law
223. 732 So. 2d 1044, 1058 (Fla. 1999) (eliminating "duty to retreat from the residence before
resorting to deadly force against a co-occupant or invitee if necessary to prevent death or great
bodily harm"). See Suk, The True Woman, supra note 39, at 256-57 (discussing case); Michelle
Jaffe, Note, Up in Arms over Florida's New "Stand Your Ground" Law, 30 NOVA L. REV. 155,
173-75 (2005).
224. Cf Jarvis DeBerry, Can You Imagine Trayvon Martin Using George Zimmerman's
Defense?: Jarvis DeBerry, N. ORLEANS TImEs-PICAYUNE (July 17, 2013, 8:19 AM), http://www.
nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2013/07/canyou_imagine-trayvonmartin.html (arguing that if the
races had been reversed "[c]onservatives wouldn't have wasted a nanosecond considering
Martin's argument of self-defense"); see infra notes 256-58 (discussing Marissa Alexander case).
225. See generally Gruber, Murder, supra note 27, at 141-55 (discussing pro-severity and pro-
leniency proposals to address discriminatory mercy); Aya Gruber, Leniency as a Miscarriage of
Race and Gender Justice, 76 ALB. L. REv. 1571 (2013) (arguing that severity should not be the
natural solution to miscarriages of racial and gender justice).
226. Cf Gruber, Murder, supra note 27, at Part IV (providing an "institutional" analysis of
murder sentencing to aid in the determination of whether to limit or restrict the provocation
defense because of the doctrine's utilization by wife killers).
227. See supra notes 104, 126, and accompanying text.
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adds to the problems of mass incarceration and racialized policing and
thus with a presumption against greater severity in criminal law.
It seems that many liberal commentators did not engage in such
analysis before condemning stand-your-ground laws. Indeed, calls to
repeal the law and to study it occurred at the same time. 22 8 Thus, when
stand your ground's repeal became the center of advocacy efforts, advo-
cates had not yet fully grappled with two fundamental issues: (1)
Whether state actors have generally applied the doctrine in a manner that
unfairly disadvantages minorities; and (2) if so, whether the answer is to
apply the doctrine to a greater number of minority defendants or to
fewer white defendants. Turning to the first issue, now, roughly two
years after the shooting, we have some empirical evidence on stand your
ground and racial bias.22 9 After perusing the studies, only a couple
things are clear. First, the question of whether the stand-your-ground
law, itself, disadvantages African Americans is extremely complex. Sec-
ond, regardless of stand your ground, state actors apply self-defense doc-
trine in an intensely racially disparate manner.2 30
In a mind-blowing twist, amidst the stand-your-ground media fer-
vor, none other than Fox News publicized the Tampa Bay Times's find-
ing that Florida's stand-your-ground law may serve to benefit
defendants of color more than white defendants, and conservative pun-
dits used this finding as further ground to support the law.23 1 This per-
haps marked the first time that right-wing commentators supported a law
because of its tendency to be merciful toward minority murder suspects
228. The calls to repeal started within weeks of the shooting, even before the DOJ Civil Rights
Commission announced on May 31, 2012, that it would investigate the laws for bias. See supra
notes 205-07 and accompanying text; Adam Cohen, A Push to Repeal 'Stand Your Ground'
Laws, TIME (Apr. 16, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/04/16/the-growing-movement-to-repeal-
stand-your-ground-laws/#ixzz2sCJ3lEkg ("The [anti-stand-your-ground] campaign is getting
strong support from the NAACP and other civil rights groups, who argue that 'Stand your ground'
laws are more likely to be used to defend white people who kill blacks than the reverse.").
229. See, e.g., John K. Roman, Race, Justifiable Homicide, and Stand Your Ground Laws:
Analysis of FBI Supplementary Homicide Report Data, URBAN INSTrn-rE (July 2013), http://
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412873-stand-your-ground.pdf (methodological analysis of race
and stand your ground); Martin et al., supra note 13 (lay tally of racial effects of stand-your-
ground law in Florida). I could find no other studies that look at the racial implications of only
stand your ground (or lack of duty to retreat) versus self-defense in general.
230. See infra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
231. See Sherwin Lott & John Lott, What Liberal Media Won't Tell You-Blacks Benefit Most
from Stand Your Ground Laws, Fox NEWS (July 31, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/
2013/07/31/what-liberal-media-wont-tell-blacks-benefit-most-from-stand-your-ground-laws/. But
cf Emily Arrowood, Hannity Is Wrong: Stand Your Ground Laws Don't "Benefit" Afican-
Americans, MEDIA MATTERS (Aug. 22, 2013, 1:19 AM), http://mediamatters.org/research/2013/
08/22/hannity-is-wrong-stand-your-ground-laws-dont-be/195528 (quoting conservative news
commentator Sean Hannity).
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and defendants.23 2 Again, however, the stand-your-ground debate was
mixed up with the highly publicized gun control debate, and politics
certainly makes strange bedfellows.2 33 Nevertheless, this underscores
the point that, as a doctrine of general leniency, it was inevitable that the
stand-your-ground law would sometimes benefit minority suspects and
defendants.23 4 Outside of the Florida study, research has not persua-
sively established that the law's primary effect is to advantage whites
and disadvantage blacks.2 35 In fact, one leading study indicates that the
law's primary racial effect is increasing the probability of white male
deaths by shooting, with no general effect on African American
populations.236
One reason it is so difficult to examine the racial equities of leni-
ency toward violent offenders is that violent crimes generate defendants
and victims with competing interests, and these parties may be of the
same race. In victimless crimes, one could easily predict that conscious
and unconscious biases, as well as structural inequalities, will result in
white defendants receiving more leniency than black defendants. For
example, empirical evidence demonstrates that the criminal system
treats black drug crime defendants more harshly than similarly situated
white defendants. 237 However, inserting a victim into the equation com-
plicates matters. State actors and jurors' racial biases may manifest as
harshness toward black defendants or as leniency toward those who
offend against black victims. In fact, it may be the case that the race of
the victim is a greater predictor of outcomes than the race of the defen-
dant.23 8 Given that many violent offenses (and the vast majority of
232. See Arrowood, supra note 231 (Fox contributor Jason Riley critiqued the liberal position,
stating, "[s]o to the extent that we are limiting the ability of poor blacks to defend themselves-I
mean, these efforts are actually resulting in people's lives being taken."); Lott & Lott, supra note
231 ("Do we really want to live in a country where poor people in high crime urban areas hunker
down, afraid to leave their homes?").
233. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
234. See Gruber, Murder, supra note 27, at Part IV.B (citing statistics showing that young men
of color disproportionately constitute murder suspects and defendants and speculating that making
the law of murder more severe would significantly burden this population).
235. See infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
236. Chandler B. McClellan & Erdal Tekin, Stand Your Ground Laws, Homicides, and Injuries
7 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18187, 2012), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/wl8187 ("Our results indicate that between 28 and 33 additional white
males are killed each month as a result of these laws, accounting for about 8 to 9 percent of all the
white male murder victims in 2010. We find no evidence to indicate that these laws cause an
increase in homicides among blacks.").
237. See Traci Schlesinger, Racial Disparities in Pretrial Diversion, 3 RACE & JUST. 210, 223
(2013), available at http://raj.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/04/05/2153368713483320.full.pdf
(quoting study finding that "[bllack defendants have odds of receiving pretrial diversion that are
44% lower than those of White defendants charged with similar offenses").
238. This has been found to be the case in studies of the death penalty. Most experts agree that
the racial bias is attached to the race of the victim and not necessarily to the race of the defendant,
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murders) are intraracial,239 if the victim's race is more salient than the
defendant's race, it could be the case that, in general, black homicide
defendants receive more lenient treatment than white homicide defend-
ants.24 0 One might also expect, however, that blacks-who-kill-whites
receive the harshest treatment and that whites-who-kill-blacks receive
the most lenient treatment, although death penalty studies seem to vali-
date the first proposition but not the second.24 1 Applying these observa-
tions to stand your ground, one might predict that black defendants, on
average, benefit more from stand your ground than white defendants
(given biases against black victims), blacks-who-kill-whites benefit the
least from the doctrine, and perhaps whites-who-kill-blacks benefit the
most. If this were the case, the situation would already be plenty compli-
cated.242 In fact, the empirical racial picture of stand your ground is even
more convoluted.
As of the time of publication, it appears that a July 2013 Urban
that is, a death sentence is more likely for those who kill whites. See Matthew B. Robinson, The
Real Death Penalty: Capital Punishment According to the Experts, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. ART. 3
(2009) (surveying death penalty "experts," finding that eighty-four percent believed it was racially
biased and that "the racial bias in capital punishment does not pertain to race of defendant but
rather to race of victim"). See, e.g., Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Death
Sentencing in North Carolina, 1980-2007, 89 N.C. L. REv. 2119, 2145 (2011) (conducting
twenty-eight year study and concluding that victim race "is a strong predictor of who is sentenced
to death in North Carolina"); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of
Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN L. REV. 27, 105
(1984) (conducting study of eight states' capital systems and finding that race-of-victim
discrimination "is a remarkably stable and consistent phenomenon"); Unah, supra note 191, at 77
(conducting study and concluding that "[d]efendants of whatever race who kill White victims are
significantly worse off than defendants who kill Black victims").
239. See Alexia Cooper & Erica L. Smith, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide Trends in the
United States, 1980-2008, NCJ 236018, 13 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf (finding that between 1980 and 2008, eighty-four percent of white victims
were killed by whites and ninety-three percent of black victims were killed by blacks).
240. This was the case in the McCleskey litigation, see supra note 193, where the data exposed
that white defendants were nearly twice as likely to receive a death sentence as black defendants.
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987) (noting the "reverse racial disparity").
241. The "Baldus study" in McCleskey did find that blacks who killed whites were far more
likely to receive a death sentence than any other group (a 22% chance). Brief for Petitioner, supra
note 193, at 11-15. However, whites who killed blacks were slightly more likely to get the death
penalty (3% chance) than blacks who killed blacks (1% chance). Id. Other studies have indicated
that the race of the victim is the only clear predictor of outcomes. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF
RACIAL DISPARrrs 5-6 (1990) (synthesizing twenty-eight death penalty studies and concluding
that "[t]he race of victim influence was found at all stages of the criminal justice system process"
but "evidence for the influence of the race of defendant on death penalty outcomes was
equivocal").
242. In the death penalty context, there is some progressive schizophrenia about how to frame
the racial problem, given that abolition-the preferred solution-benefits minority defendants, but
the identified problem is leniency toward killers of minority victims. See Gruber, Murder, supra
note 27.
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Institute study analyzing FBI crime report data is the leading, if not the
only, systematic study of stand your ground's racial effects.24 3 The study
concludes that there is a racial effect from stand your ground and
accordingly criticizes the law.'" However, it is worthwhile to look at
exactly what the racial effect is. In one data set, the author analyzes
cases that bear "Martin attributes," namely the parties were male strang-
ers involved in a one-on-one conflict with a gun.24 5 This narrowing
makes sense because these are the primary cases in which stand your
ground might make a difference. In such cases, the existence of stand
your ground did the following: (1) it dramatically increased the chances
a white-on-white homicide would be ruled justified; (2) it significantly
increased the chances that a black-on-white homicide would be ruled
justified; (3) it negligibly increased the chances that a white-on-black
homicide would be ruled justified; and, (4) it did not increase the
chances that a black-on-black homicide would be ruled justified.24 6
Moreover, the wide gap between the justification rates of white-on-black
243. Roman, supra note 229. Analyzing the empirical methods of the study is certainly beyond
the scope of the paper. Nevertheless, one obvious confound is that only states with stand-your-
ground statutes are counted as stand-your-ground states. States that have eliminated the duty to
retreat by judicial order or otherwise are counted as non-stand-your-ground states. Id. at 4. This
makes little sense given that police, prosecutors, and jurors are subject to the same conditions
whether by statute or judicial decision, unless the author intends to measure the psychological/
cultural effect of recent legislative fights over stand your ground, and it may skew results in the
sense that those states that enacted the ALEC version of stand your ground might already be
predisposed to greater racial biases. (Apparently, Roman made the decision to separate legislative
and judicial stand your ground on the political basis that the legislative versions of the doctrine are
easier to change). Id. Moreover, given the nature of FBI statistics, the study only measures the
effect of stand your ground on police decisions to arrest (and to a lesser extent prosecutor's
decisions to charge a manslaughter or murder) and not on ultimate outcomes. Id. at 2.
244. Interestingly, the study says that the problem with stand your ground is that it may
"exacerbate" the already extant disparities in self-defense law. Id. at 2. It is intuitive that if self-
defense, a doctrine of leniency, is applied in a racially biased manner, adding the possibility of
more leniency through stand your ground will widen the disparities. However, at least for Martin-
like cases, Roman's research does not bear this out. See id. There are many reasons why
increasing leniency might not increase disparity. The main reason is that broadening self-defense
does not necessarily broaden state actor discretion. Although it increases police and prosecutor
ability (or perceived ability) to treat favored defendants leniently, it may simultaneously decrease
their power (or perceived power) to treat disfavored defendants harshly. Alternatively, the non-
stand-your ground status quo might represent the fixed endpoints of racialized discretion. In other
words, state actors are already inclined to treat whites who kill blacks so favorably that adding
leniency is irrelevant and so inclined to treat blacks who kill whites harshly that they will find
ways around any new doctrine of leniency.
245. Id. at 9.
246. Id. The percentage of justified white-on-white homicides was nearly double in stand-
your-ground jurisdictions (12.95% in non-stand-your-ground states versus 23.58% in stand-your-
ground states). The percentage of justified white-on-black homicides were only slightly higher in
stand-your-ground states (41.14% versus 44.71%). Stand your ground had a more profound effect
on black-on-white homicides (7.69% versus 11.10%), and virtually no effect on black-on-black
homicides (in fact, the justification rate went down slightly: 10.24% versus 9.94%). Id.
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killings and black-on-white killings (the former is about three times
more likely to be ruled justified than the latter) was the same in stand-
your-ground and non-stand-your-ground states.24 7 Finally, in stand-your-
ground states, blacks who killed whites were actually treated more leni-
ently than blacks who killed blacks.24 8
What is a critical race scholar to make of this information? It is true
that stand your ground did not benefit black defendants who killed other
African Americans. But that seems to be a wash, given that a benefit to
the black defendant in such a case can also be seen as a burden to a
black victim.2 49 In terms of the rather heavy burden on white victims
and consequent benefit to white and black defendants, it is not clear that
this is problematic from a racial hierarchy standpoint. One might assert
that the principal effect of stand your ground is to temper some of the
racial privilege state actors bestow on white victims. Given that privileg-
ing white victims has long been a source of consternation for race schol-
ars in the death penalty context, perhaps it is actually more equalizing to
take some of that privilege away.2 50 Alternatively, studies confirm that
prosecutors are extremely responsive to victims' families' demands and
public outrage, which are likely to be greater in white-victim cases.25 1
Perhaps stand your ground provides prosecutors political cover for leni-
247. Id. Specifically, the gap was 33.45 percentage points in non-stand-your-ground
jurisdictions and 33.61 percentage points in stand-your-ground jurisdictions. However, both types
of killings were more likely to be justified in stand-your-ground states. Id.
248. Id. In non-stand-your-ground states, black-on-white killing had the lowest justification
rate at 7.69%, compared with 10.24% for black-on-black homicides. In stand-your-ground
jurisdictions, black-on-black homicides were the least justified (9.94%), compared with 11.10%
for black-on-white homicides. Id. The study finds a more expectable racial effect (that is, a
distinct benefit to white defendants, and especially whites who kill blacks) when it does not
narrow the pool to Martin-type cases. Id. at 7 (finding the justification rate for white defendant
homicides to nearly double, the justification rate for black-on-black homicides to increase
significantly, and the justification rate for black-on-white homicides to increase minimally). The
problem is that there is much noise in that comparison, given that it includes many types of
homicides in which stand your ground would not likely apply. In any case, the main point is not so
much that there is definitively no exacerbating effect of stand your ground, so much as the effect
was not clear at the time the anti-stand-your-ground movement took hold, and it is still not clear.
249. Critics condemn uneven application of the death penalty on the principle ground that it
devalues black victims. See Gross & Mauro, supra note 238, at 107 (observing that "it has been
argued that our society tends to view blacks as 'devalued crime victims"'); Charles J. Ogletree,
Jr., Black Man's Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in America, 81 OR. L. REv. 15, 32 (2002)
(contending disparity shows that "[w]hite lives are considered to be more valuable than black
lives").
250. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 367 (1987) (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("If society
were indeed forced to choose between a racially discriminatory death penalty (one that provides
heightened protection against murder 'for whites only') and no death penalty at all, the choice
mandated by the Constitution would be plain.").
251. See Gross & Mauro, supra note 238, at 107 (noting the argument that prosecutors pursue
the death penalty in "homicides that are visible and disturbing to the majority of the community,
and these will tend to be white-victim homicides").
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ent treatment in close cases involving white victims. 252
While stand your ground might not compound racial bias, it is clear
that there are gross racial disparities in the application of self-defense
law in general. Regardless of stand your ground, white defendants are
far more successful when pleading self-defense than black defend-
ants.2 5 3 Moreover, white-on-black homicides are deemed justified far
more often than black-on-white or black-on-black homicides.25 4 Finally,
those who kill white victims are charged with murder disproportionately
to those who kill black victims (although stand your ground actually
closes this gap quite a bit).25 5 In the end, the current empirical evidence
tends to show that self-defense law is riddled with anti-minority dispari-
ties, these disparities exist in stand-your-ground and non-stand-your-
ground jurisdictions, but they are not necessarily worse in stand-your-
ground jurisdictions.
This brings us to the second fundamental issue not necessarily
addressed by stand-your-ground critics: What should be done when state
actors and jurors apply doctrines of criminal leniency in a disparate
manner? It is quite evident that the existence of self-defense dispropor-
tionately benefits whites who kill blacks, but surely the answer cannot
be to eliminate self-defense. To do so might somewhat equalize homi-
cide prosecution, but it would be at the cost of all the black defendants
(and other defendants) who could have benefitted from that doctrine of
leniency. In the same vein, assuming that George Zimmerman would
have lost out in a non-stand-your-ground world, we might also ask who
else would be on the losing end. Marissa Alexander, the black Florida
woman who unsuccessfully asserted self-defense during her trial for
shooting her allegedly abusive husband, has served as critics' irrefutable
proof that stand your ground is indelibly stamped "for White defendants
only." 256 The logic then proceeds that if stand your ground serves exclu-
sively to benefit white defendants and burden black victims, it should be
repealed.257 Even if that were the case, which apparently it is not, the
252. Thus, prosecutors rely on stand your ground the way that Corey attempted to. See supra
notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
253. See Roman, supra note 229, at 7-9.
254. See supra notes 246-47.
255. See Roman, supra note 229, at 9. In non-stand-your-ground jurisdictions the gap between
the justification rates for white-victim homicides and black-victim homicides is 15.37 percentage
points, but only 9.98 percentage points in stand-your-ground jurisdictions. Id.
256. See Amanda Marcotte, Marissa Alexander, Sentenced to 20 Years for Firing One Shot
Into the Ceiling, Gets a Retrial, SLATE (Sept. 26, 2013, 2:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx
factor/2013/09/26/marissaalexanderandstand-your-ground-sheclaimed self defense but
was.html (observing that the "case created a national outcry" over the racially discriminatory
application of stand your ground); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 367 (1987) (Stevens, J.
dissenting) (using "for Whites only" in death penalty context).
257. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
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question would remain: What to do about Marissa Alexander? If the
problem is that Marissa Alexander deserved leniency under stand your
ground but was denied the doctrine, should the answer be to deny every-
body, including future Marissa Alexanders, benefit of the doctrine?
Some may believe that Alexander could have been acquitted regardless
of stand your ground, but the same might be said of George Zimmer-
man. Critics are clear that the injustice lay in the judge's unfair denial of
Alexander's stand-your-ground claim, which predicated her unjust
conviction.258
The problem racial critics of stand your ground face is two-fold.
First, it seems quite unlikely that one can remedy disparity simply by
making the law generally more severe.259 Without some change to the
way police, prosecutors, and jurors manage their discretion, broadening
self-defense law simply makes the criminal system more lenient (more
overall acquittals) with disparities intact,260 while narrowing self-
defense law simply makes the system more severe (more overall convic-
tions) with the disparities intact.261 Second, even if a unilateral legal
change could address disparity, the question remains whether the law
should be broader or narrower. 262 In the stand-your-ground context, the
choice to retain leniency and the choice to make the law more severe are
equally satisfying or unsatisfying depending on the context. An
extremely broad self-defense law might force state actors and jurors to
treat defendants like Marissa Alexander leniently, but might also tip the
scales toward folks like Zimmerman. An extremely narrow self-defense
law might stop state actors from letting people like Zimmerman off the
hook, but it might make for a more difficult defense for defendants like
Alexander. In principle, there is no reason to choose the punitive regime
over the lenient one. Moreover, progressive critics have never had, and
258. See Tourd, Where Was 'Stand Your Ground' for Marissa Alexander?, TIME (Apr. 12,
2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/04/30/where-was-stand-your-ground-for-marissa-alexander/
(critic of stand your ground arguing that Marissa Alexander should have had a successful stand-
your-ground claim).
259. Were one to eliminate diversion, see supra note 237, both black and white defendants
could not receive a diversionary disposition, and such defendants would necessarily receive a
harsher sentence. However, there would likely remain disparities in the actual sentences of black
and white low-level offenders.
260. In fact, there is evidence that this is precisely what stand your ground did. It reproduced
(if slightly reduced) racial disparities, just with greater leniency all around.
261. See Alafair S. Burke, Equality, Objectivity, and Neutrality, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1043, 1066
(2005) (reviewing LEE, supra note 138) ("If a bar is unlevel, it can be leveled only by adjusting
one side more than the other" rather than simply "rais[ing] the bar entirely, with its original slant
intact.").
262. Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying Prosecutorial
Discrimination Against Black Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998 SUP. CT. REv. 145, 161-62
("Every equal protection case poses the problem of whether to 'level up' or 'level down.'").
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still do not have, good empirical evidence that the punitive regime is
more racially palatable than the lenient regime. Nevertheless, as has
often occurred in the domestic violence and provocation contexts,2 63
when faced with a case of leniency toward an ostensible subordinator,
many progressives choose greater punitivity in our current penal state.26 4
The next Part ruminates on why many critics focus on repealing stand
your ground, in lieu of the more obviously racialized issues generated by
the Zimmerman case, and why they support remedying the perceived
bias of stand your ground through mainstreaming severity, rather than
mainstreaming leniency or something else altogether.
PART IV: THE PUNITIVE IMPULSE
Thus far, I have lamented that the ascendency of the stand-your-
ground issue prevented the Zimmerman case from serving as a catalyst
of change on the various troubling issues laid out in Part II. I further
asserted that stand your ground is a somewhat peculiar site of racial
outrage and its perceived racial problems do not necessarily mandate
repeal. This Part seeks to situate some progressive commentators' choice
to elevate stand your ground in the context of larger shifts in late twenti-
eth-century American ideology regarding social dysfunction and crimi-
nal punishment. In short, it asserts that at least part of the story is a
"punitive impulse" that can lead progressives to seek solutions to race-
and gender-based harm through strengthening criminal law's ability to
punish individuals who commit offenses against minorities and women.
Accordingly, this Part advances a caution to gender and race scholars
that embracing solutions of criminal severity might actually undermine
the progressive view that raced and gendered harms are substantially
products of embedded social and cultural norms and instead reinscribe
the prevalent concept that bigotry and criminality are individualistic
deviations from the norm.265
To be sure, it seems natural, in the face of racist harm that goes
unpunished, to seek greater criminal enforcement and punishment so
that such future harm is less likely to occur. However, this move is
neither natural nor pre-political. The retroactive application of harsh
criminal sanctions to individuals is only one of many ways to approach
harm and social dysfunction, even racialized harm and dysfunction.266
The punitive model of addressing harm has a specific political history in
263. See generally Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 26; Gruber, Murder, supra note 27.
264. See MARIE GoTrSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMRICA 249 (2006) (linking mass incarceration to the tendency of lawmakers
to "level-up" rather than risk "leveling down" in the face of disparities).
265. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
266. See GARLAND, supra note 118, at 167-93 (discussing the ways in which late twentieth-
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late twentieth-century America and connects with a particular vision of
political economy. 26 7 This model has been so influential and consistent
for decades that it approaches an unconscious impulse.268 When faced
with whatever they consider to be condemnable harm, people all over
the political spectrum are quick to embrace ever more severe punish-
ment of the individuals most readily identified as the causes of the
harm.269
Before describing the punitive impulse in more detail, let me add a
caveat. It is certainly impossible to prove in any systematic or even per-
suasive manner that stand your ground became a central issue in the
Zimmerman case because progressives acted on punitive impulse.
Indeed, there are a multitude of reasons why stand your ground rose to
the forefront. Not the least of these reasons is its political connection to
the gun-control debate.270 Moreover, once stand your ground came to
the fore, the media had a field day uncovering cases where its applica-
tion seemed patently outrageous.2 7 1 Thus, perhaps racial justice-seekers
started out condemning Zimmerman's racial profiling and the police and
prosecutors' biased reaction, but the flood of discussion on stand your
ground stamped out alternate voices or led commentators to concentrate
on the issue with most traction.272 Moreover, some progressive critics
may have just assumed based on anecdote that stand your ground pro-
vided very little distributive benefits to minorities and concluded that
repeal represented the only or most effective avenue toward racial equal-
ity.2 7 3 However, one cannot discount the possibility that some liberal
thinkers, like many other Americans when faced with an instance of
criminal harm, had a gut reaction that harsher criminal penalties would
century punitivity is an embedded culture and contrasting it with other models governing,
mentalities regarding, and policy choices directed toward reducing crime).
267. See infra notes 277-83 and accompanying text.
268. This is similar to the influence of rights formalism on progressives in the latter twentieth-
century. See Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFr
LEGALISMILEFT CRITIQUE 178, 189 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (asserting that
"rights now bear the main burden of universalization for both [liberals and conservatives]").
269. Others have described this tendency as a strategic choice. See Simon, supra note 127, at
1417 ("[W]e govern through crime when crime becomes a metaphor or analogy through which we
apply the same technologies and mentalities established to govern crime onto very different
issues . . . . This means that activists seeking to change conditions in any and all of these settings
have real incentives to model their complaints as concerns about crime, construct themselves as
victims of the willful wrongdoing of others, and invoke a prosecutorial-like response from
government.").
270. See supra notes 22-23; Nichols, supra note 31 (quoting Mayor Bloomberg as stating,
"[stand-your-ground] laws-drafted by gun lobby extremists in Washington-encourage deadly
confrontations by enabling people to shoot first and argue 'justifiable homicide' later").
271. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., supra note 228 (NAACP claiming stand your ground only benefits whites).
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have deterred the criminal actor (Zimmerman) and prevented a death.274
Given this reaction, it then seems to follow naturally that strengthening
criminal sanctions is the primary way to address the Trayvon tragedy.27 5
Consequently, this Part provides a caution against the hasty embrace of a
punitive gut reaction, while fully recognizing that this is only part of the
story of stand your ground's ascendency to the primary issue in the Zim-
merman case.
The punitive impulse stems from a distinct punitive ideology that
embraces a particular set of normative commitments, empirical assump-
tions, and a specific view of the role of government. For decades, crimi-
nal law and policy in the United States has conceived of criminal
offenders as dangerous, abnormal actors, who are the unique cause of
social disorder, retributively deserve harsh punishment, and need to be
totally incapacitated in order to prevent recidivism and deter others from
committing crime.27 6 The ideology of crime as a disease of inequality
and social breakdown to be prevented through ex-ante social programs
or addressed with ex-post treatment seems as pass6 as the zoot suits that
were en vogue at the same time as the ideology. It is thus difficult to
imagine a paradigm under which criminal punishment is a measure of
last resort to be used exceedingly sparingly. Nevertheless, our current
punitive paradigm did not always exist, and the penal sanction is not an
inherently superior technology of social engineering.
Punitive ideology emerged alongside a cadre of other late twenti-
eth-century conservative American ideologies. Increasing hostility
toward New Deal social programs from the right, combined with racial
integration and rising crime rates, made urban crime a natural issue for
Richard Nixon to politicize in his 1968 presidential campaign."
274. See GARLAND, supra note 118 (noting the shift from a focus on reforming pathological
individuals to the idea that most crime is opportunistic and may be deterred).
275. Cf Kay L. Levine, The External Evolution of Criminal Law, 45 AM. Crum. L. REv. 1039,
1057 (2008) ("The casting of an issue as a social problem for which the criminal law and justice
system appear the answer is very much a matter of context, and the successful adoption of a
criminal law framework may reflect the power of certain claims-makers and choices by the media,
rather anything natural or inherent about the problem itself.").
276. See Simon, supra note 127, at 1418 (noting that the "dominant" penal ideology reflects
"nineteenth-century notions of simple deterrence and elimination through exclusion or
execution"); Lynne Henderson, Co-Opting Compassion: The Federal Victim's Rights Amendment,
10 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 579, 586-87 (1998) (contending that society views defendants as
"monsters," or "undifferentiated, poor, angry, violent, Black, or Latino male[s]"); GARLAND,
supra note 118 (observing the trend toward dehumanizing defendants); Kyron Huigens, What Is
and Is Not Pathological in Criminal Law, 101 MICH. L. REv. 811, 812 (2002) (lamenting that
retributive rhetoric has justified a criminal "system of quarantine").
277. See Richard Nixon for President 1968 Campaign Brochures: 'The Nixon
Stand', 4PREsIDENT.ORG, http://www.4president.org/brochures/1968/nixonl968brochure.htm (last
visited Feb. 6, 2014) ("As President I would recommend to the Congress a national program-to
take the offensive against the criminal forces that threaten the peace and security of every
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Nixon's "war on crime" and Reagan's "war on drugs" went hand in
hand with their efforts to instill a certain view of government and soci-
ety, now commonly termed "neoliberalism."2 7 8 I and others have written
extensively on the connection between punitive ideology and neoliberal
political philosophy, so I will only briefly summarize that discussion
here. 279 Neoliberalism can be thought of as a hyper-liberalism in which
the conception of individuals as autonomous economic actors is more
than an observational description-it is a moral paradigm.28 0 Thus, those
who make up the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder presump-
tively deserve their lot because their poverty is, in a sense, res ipsa
loquitur-it is incontrovertible evidence of internal moral failing.8 In
this view, government intervention in matters of distribution of various
forms of capital and maintenance of a social safety-net are morally
indefensible.2 82 Consequently, many conservatives today bear a deep
distrust of any non-military, non-criminal government action.283
Tough-on-crime ideology reflects and reinforces the neoliberal
vision of individuals and society. Within neoliberal political philosophy,
American, and to rebuild respect for law across this country."). See also GARLAND, supra note
118, at 57; Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the
Conservative "Backlash, " 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1447, 1462-1505 (2003) (discussing factors leading
to the shift in penological views in the late 1960s through the 1980s); Vanessa Barker, The
Politics of Pain: A Political Institutionalist Analysis of Crime Victims' Moral Protests, 41 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 619, 625 (2007) (attributing the public attitude to increasing crime rates in the 1960s
and 1970s).
278. See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 618-19
(2009) ("The tough-on-crime philosophy that overtook America was not a singular phenomenon,
divorced from a larger political and economic program, but a distinct part of a neoliberal paradigm
of rampant individualism, minimization of government services, and unconstrained capitalism.")
(footnotes omitted); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS. PUNISHMENT AND
THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 202-03 (2011) (asserting that the American penal state has "been
facilitated by . . . the rationality of neoliberal penality").
279. See generally Gruber, supra note 278; HARCOURT, supra note 278; Loic WACQUANT,
PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SocIAL INSECURITY (2009).
280. See Gruber, supra note 278, at 620 (stating that neoliberalism "describes a moral directive
in which considerations of nuance, inequality, and social conditions must necessarily yield to
reductionists dichotomies of public-versus-private and right-versus-wrong); Wendy Brown, Neo-
liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, 7 THEORY & EVENT 1, 6 (2003).
281. See Gruber, supra note 278, at 620 (observing that in neoliberal philosophy, "the
rationally calculating individual bears full responsibility for the consequences of his or her actions
no matter how severe the constraints on this action, e.g., lack of skills, education, and childcare in
a period of high unemployment and limited welfare benefits").
282. See Brown, supra note 280, at 6 (observing that under neoliberalism "a 'mismanaged life'
becomes a new mode of depoliticizing social and economic powers and at the same time reduces
political citizenship to an unprecedented degree of passivity") (also cited in Gruber, supra note
278, at 620 n.204).
283. See, e.g., About, LANIER TEA PARTY PATRIOTS, http://www.lanierteapartypatriots.org/
about/ ("Tea Party Patriots formed to support the millions of Americans seeking to improve our
great nation through renewed support for fiscal responsibility, constitutionally limited
government, and free market economic policies.").
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essentially there is no society, and central government is, for the most
part, illegitimate; thus, grievous harm and suffering simply cannot be a
product of poor social arrangement or ineffective governing.2 84 Rather,
abnormal, yet fully morally culpable, individual actors must be the cause
of such harms. 285 Retributive rhetoric about monsters, predators, and
prowlers reinforces the notion that dysfunction is neither socially condi-
tioned nor governmentally created but internal to the individual. 28 6 Con-
sequentialist expertise then enters to prescribe carceral incapacitation as
the sole avenue toward community security.287 Thus, there is some irony
that those most critical of government interference in private economic
liberty see a very robust role for government in restricting the liberty of
deviants who draw the government's authoritarian gaze. 288 But conserv-
atives are able to adopt a Nozickian version of a night-watchman state,
where the minimal government retains power to prevent and punish
"true" harm. 289
The combination of an entrenched belief in the internal immorality
of individual criminal actors and the willingness to suspend distrust of
government when it comes to controlling criminogenic risk has proven
explosive. For decades, crime has been regular front-page fodder, and
politicians on both sides of the aisle continue to compete to be the
toughest on deviants. 290 Today, the United States ranks as the most puni-
tive Western nation, 29 1 and the criminal apparatus has transformed low-
income neighborhoods into demilitarized zones, complete with roving
284. Harris, supra note 24, at 516 ("Indeed, for many contemporary conservatives there is no
'society' at all, only individuals . . . . In this discourse, questions relating to crime and 'welfare,'
for example, become personal moral issues rather than social problems."); Angelina Snodgrass
Godoy, Converging on the Poles: Contemporary Punishment and Democracy in Hemispheric
Perspective, 30 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 515, 529 (2005) (observing that "conservatives . . .
refram[ed] the crime issue from a question of inadequate social welfare to one of insufficient
social control").
285. See supra note 280.
286. See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
287. See GARLAND, supra note 118; Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for
Restorative Justice in the United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 414 (commenting that
rehabilitation has been replaced by incapacitation).
288. HARCOURT, supra note 278, at 203 (observing the coexistence of "the assumption of
government legitimacy and competence in the penal arena and, on the other hand, the presumption
that the government should not play a role elsewhere").
289. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix (1974) (advocating "a minimal
state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of
contracts, and so on").
290. See supra note 6; Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality, and
the Future of Mass Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REv. 851, 853 (2009) (noting Democrats'
support for "punitive criminal justice policy").
291. See Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 911, 913 (2007)
(observing that "the United States leads the world" in imprisonment).
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squads of masked police combatants.2 92 In essence, the price of
neoliberal non-governance of economic actors has been the hyper-gov-
ernance of minorities and the poor, the groups with the least political
power.293 On a macro-level, progressives are more than willing to cri-
tique punitive ideology. The profusion of commentary condemning mass
incarceration grows daily. Attorney General Eric Holder, for example,
recently used his bully pulpit to focus the public on the problem of the
cradle-to-prison pipeline.294 Progressives regularly critique sentences as
too high, juvenile dispositions as too harsh, and police as too abusive.29 5
When looking at punitive ideology in abstraction, those on the left read-
ily counter the notion that offenders are internally evil, support preven-
tion and rehabilitation rather than long incarceration, and call for strict
limits on the power of the police.
The punitive impulse, however, is not an ideology. Thus, while as a
philosophical matter, one might absolutely reject punitive ideology as
too conservative, archaic, or immoral, one might nonetheless react to
harm in ways that are influenced by punitive impulse. The impulse
manifests as intuition that the best course of action is one that severely
punishes the harm-doer.296 In this way, progressives who normally resist
punitive ideology might nonetheless manifest punitive impulses by pre-
cipitately embracing proposals to intensify penal severity against those
who commit crimes involving racial or gender bias. Thus, for many fem-
inists, the natural way to tackle the problem of domestic violence is by
enacting laws that mandate state actors to subject abusers to harsh pun-
292. See generally RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR Cop: THE MILITARIZATION OF
AMERICA'S POLICE FORCES (2013).
293. See WACQUANT, supra note 279, at 297 ("The widening of the penal dragnet under
neoliberalism has been remarkably discriminating: . .. it has affected essentially the denizens of
the lower regions of social and physical space.").
294. See Press Release, House Committee on the Judiciary, Conyers and Scott Praise Attorney
General Holder's Action to Curtail Mandatory Minimum Sentences (Aug. 12, 2013), available at
http://democrats.judiciary.house.gov/press-release/conyers-and-scott-praise-attomey-general-
holder%E2%80%99s-action-curtail-mandatory-minimum.
295. Compare Press Release, Dick Durbin, Durbin and Lee Introduce Smarter Sentencing Act
(Aug. 1, 2013), available at http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=
be68ad86-aOa4-4486-853f-f8ef7b99e736 ("Mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent drug
offenses have played a huge role in the explosion of the U.S. prison population. . . . Many of these
sentences have disproportionately affected minority populations and helped foster deep distrust of
the criminal justice system") with Press Release, Dick Durbin, Durbin: It Is Time for Stand Your
Ground Laws to Be Carefully Reconsidered (Oct. 29, 2013), available at http://www.durbin.
senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=be68ad86-aOa4-4486-853f-f8ef7b99e736 ("'Stand
your ground' laws have allowed shooters to walk free in shocking and violent situations, including
shootouts between rival gangs, drug deals gone bad and more.").
296. As one scholar notes, even for the skeptical, "it is difficult to shake the paradigm that the
criminal law is the natural response to a social problem." Deborah Ahrens, Schools, Cyberbullies,
and the Surveillance State, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1669, 1712 (2012).
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ishment.2 97 In the face of an "epidemic" of human trafficking, a number
of progressives passionately called for strict international and domestic
criminal penalties.2 98 Minority legal theorists often view enhancing
criminal sentences as the best way to deal with crimes motivated by
bigoted animus.2 99
While progressives may hope that they can simultaneously pursue
criminalization programs and strategies to undermine entrenched social
and racial and gender institutional hierarchy, experience shows such a
convergence is unlikely.3 00 In our disciplinary culture, faith invested in
the criminal system, especially by progressives, serves inevitably to bol-
ster the existing racist, classist, and masculinist American penal state.30 1
It is true that it is possible, depending on the context, for the anti-subor-
dination benefits of a particular prosecutorial reform to outweigh the
drawbacks, including the drawback of reinforcing punitive ideology.
Nevertheless, the punitive impulse manifests, not in the fact that
progressives sometimes support criminalization, but in the assumptions
that criminalization must be part of addressing social harm, that criminal
reform requires no special scrutiny, and that criminal law holds more
297. See generally Gruber, supra note 26.
298. See Meghan Ashford-Grooms, Perry Signs Bills with Stricter Penalties for Human
Trafficking, POLITIFACT (May 25, 2011), http://www.politifact.com/texas/promises/perry-o-meter/
promise/848/toughen-law-against-human-traffickers/ (reporting that Republican Governor Rick
Perry signed a bill sponsored by two democratic state congresswomen that created a new life
offense for human trafficking and that Perry kept his promise to "toughen the state's laws against
human trafficking").
299. Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: Antigay Bullying in School, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 385, 437
(2012) (noting that "the objective gay rights activists hope to achieve through hate crime
legislation [is] sending a message that gay bashing is no different than lynching an African
American man simply because he is black"); but see Dean Spade, Their Laws Will Never Make Us
Safer, in AGAINST EQUALITY: PRISONs WILL NOT PROTECT YOU (Ryan Conrad, ed. 2012)
(critiquing reliance on hate crime legislation on the ground that "criminalization and
imprisonment target and harm queer and trans people" and "hate crime laws will not address the
urgent survival issues in our lives").
300. I am not saying that progressives should never consider thoughtful criminal sanctions as a
component of comprehensive programs to address pressing problems. However, given the
transcendence of punitive ideology in late modem America, the criminal law portions of such
comprehensive proposals quickly take over the distributive and cultural portions that challenge the
neoliberal paradigm. See Gruber, supra note 26 at 811-14 (noting that domestic violence criminal
law is extremely tough and the government funnels money to this punitive mission, yet lawmakers
have remained reluctant to address the economic and social conditions precedent to continued
abuse).
301. See Spade, supra note 299; Dianne L. Martin, Retribution Revisited: A Reconsideration of
Feminist Criminal Law Reform Strategies, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 151, 160 (1998) (stating that
"[tlhe criminal justice apparatus is about order and its reproduction, and about maintaining the
existing hierarchy of status and privilege"); Mari J. Matsuda, Crime and Affirmative Action, I J.
GENDER, RACE & JusT. 309, 319 (1998) (stating that "the criminal justice system is a primary
location of racist, sexist, homophobic, and class-biased oppression in this country").
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promise than peril to the progressive agenda.3 0 2 The impulse, it appears,
hastened a failure of progressive imagination and misguided priorities in
the analysis of the Zimmerman case. Under its influence, one might
believe that the best way to combat racial profiling by neighborhood
watchers or others is to severely punish the few who end up killing the
profilee. The punitive impulse might lead one to believe that the best
way to control racial bias in policing and prosecution is by making it
easier for prosecutors to achieve conviction. In short, the punitive
impulse transmogrifies progressive anti-hierarchy, anti-authoritarian,
and anti-subordination energy into passionate support for state-centric
punitive intervention.
CONCLUSION
This article tells the story of how political influences and prevalent
punitive consciousness rendered the Zimmerman saga largely a caution-
ary tale about overly lenient, "pro-violence" criminal policies, rather
than an expos6 of rampant racial hierarchy in the administration of jus-
tice and society in general. In addition, it may be the case that the only
fruit born of the massive progressive advocacy efforts in the wake of the
case are proposals (now largely failed) to narrow self-defense and
strengthen murder law. Perhaps commentators are correct that stand
your ground does not strike the correct balance between convicting bad
killers and exonerating good killers and the law encourages future wan-
ton killings (especially because so many people have now heard of stand
your ground and believe it means "shoot away"). However, as a critic of
the penal state, I am generally skeptical of claims that strengthening
criminal law ensures that the "right" people will be convicted and has a
linear relationship to crime reduction. Nevertheless, that is beside my
point, which is only that hegemonic cultural forces flattened the rich
discussion of race, hierarchy, and state power, into a simple conversa-
tion about lack of efficient crime control.
The continued existence of stand your ground does introduce an
interesting inconsistency into criminal law administration that may not
be so obvious. Normally in homicide cases, police, prosecutors, and
judges treat defendants particularly severely and are particularly inflexi-
ble with defense attorneys because of the crime's gravity. Of course, one
might believe that state actors should be more careful in such prosecu-
tions, given what is at stake for the defendant. Nevertheless, it is hardly
controversial to say that police and prosecutors are generally unreceptive
to murder defendants' side of the story. Wading through the stand-your-
302. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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ground files on the Tampa Bay Times's website is thus almost a surreal
experience. 303 It emerges that the stand-your-ground law, in a sense, has
humanized Florida homicide defendants. It seems that, in many cases,
police and prosecutors did not adopt the typical attitude that there is a
killer and a victim-case closed. Rather, state authorities were attuned
to the contexts of the killings, the defendants' backgrounds and thought
processes, and the human interactions involved.3 * Progressives might
hope that police and prosecutors would adopt a similar attitude towards
other classes of defendants-those accused of prostitution, drug posses-
sion, burglary, theft, etc. Progressives might be pleased if every defen-
dant received an immunity hearing with a judge sympathetic to the
context in which the crime occurred. Thus, the schizophrenic disparity
created by stand your ground is that it leads police authorities to human-
ize defendants and contextualize facts in the set of cases for which
prosecutorial severity and inflexibility seems particularly appropriate
(even to progressives), leaving lower-level offenders to receive the full
moral reprobation of the state.
One could certainly make the case that a piecemeal approach to a
kinder and gentler form of policing and prosecution should not start with
murder law. Homicide should probably not be the primary locus of
decarceration efforts, and no criminal law scholar would propose to
incrementally reduce incarceration rates primarily through exonerating
murderers. However, one can still caution progressive critics of the
penal state to be wary of hastily supporting programs that undo the few
decriminalization reforms that have occurred, or call for new forms of
criminalization directed toward purportedly privileged criminals. In
addition to increasing actual incarceration, when progressives advocate
criminalization for the harms they see as most pressing, it serves to fur-
ther normalize, legitimize, and entrench the overarching punitive ideol-
ogy. This in turn strengthens the punitive impulse, and the feedback loop
is complete. The time may now have passed for the Zimmerman case to
be a major catalyst of racial or anti-authoritarian change. The unfortu-
303. See supra note 129.
304. In one fascinating case profiled by the Times, the prosecutors declined to prosecute two
neighbors and former friends in a racially diverse/divided neighborhood, one black and one white,
whose relationship had broken down and who ended up shooting each other over a petty dispute.
In the non-surreal world of stand your ground, one might expect that both men would end up in
jail with long prison terms, lives ruined. Instead, the prosecutor decided that both came under the
umbrella of self-defense and declined to prosecute either man. Of course, both were upset,
claiming the other was at fault. However, the ultimate result was that one neighbor moved away.
The situation was thus resolved with no more violence and both men free, lives intact. See Susan
Taylor Martin, Sometimes, the 'Stand Your Ground' Defense Cuts Both Ways, TAMPA BAY TDWEs




nate reality is the case is not the first or last of its kind (although it may
have exhausted public interest in the issue). My hope is that in the future
progressive commentary will consistently critique state punitive author-
ity and expose and fight institutionalized racial inequality, without
allowing progressive "ideas and credibility [to be] appropriated to
strengthen an apparatus that . .. should be dismantled."os
305. Martin, supra note 301, at 153.
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